Productivity and the economic cycle by Bhaumik, Sumon
  
BIS ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 12 
Productivity and the Economic 
Cycle 
MARCH 2011 

 
 
 
 
 
 
BIS ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 12 
Productivity and the 
Economic Cycle 
DR SUMON BHAUMIK 
ASTON BUSINESS SCHOOL, ASTON 
UNIVERSITY 
MARCH 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed within this paper are those of the author and should not be treated 
as Government policy
 

Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
Contents 
List of Tables and Figures......................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgments...................................................................................................................... vi 
Foreword.................................................................................................................................... vii 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. viii 
Part 1 – A Review of the Literature.......................................................................................... viii 
Part 2 – Impact of the 2008-2009 Recession on Productivity and Recovery in the UK.............xi 
Part 1 A Review of the Literature ............................................................................................... 1 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 
2. Pro-cyclicality of productivity growth ............................................................................... 5 
2.1  Hypotheses for observed pro-cyclicality ........................................................................ 6 
2.2 Implications of the hypotheses ...................................................................................... 7 
2.3 Evidence from empirical analyses ................................................................................. 7 
2.4 Evidence from micro data.............................................................................................. 8 
3. Sources of productivity growth ............................................................................................. 9 
3.1  Net entry explains a significant proportion of productivity growth but within-firm factors 
are possibly more important ...................................................................................................... 9 
3.2  Explaining the relatively smaller impact of net entry: institutional rigidities and firm 
characteristics ......................................................................................................................... 11 
4. Within-firm versus external determinants of productivity............................................. 14 
4.1 Competition, managerial skill and their cyclicality........................................................ 15 
4.2 Within-firm strategies and their cyclicality.................................................................... 16 
4.2.1 Innovation and pro-cyclicality of R&D expenditure ..................................................... 16 
4.2.2 Pro-cyclicality of business investment ........................................................................ 18 
4.2.3 Likely pro-cyclicality of investment in ICT capital ....................................................... 19 
 i 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 
4.2.4 Mixed evidence about investment in human capital ................................................... 24 
5. Conclusions........................................................................................................................... 26 
References ................................................................................................................................. 28 
Part 2 Impact of the 2008-2009 Recession on Productivity and Recovery in the UK ......... 33 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 34 
2. Determinants of productivity............................................................................................ 36 
3. Enterprise........................................................................................................................... 40 
3.1 Policy discussion within the UK ................................................................................... 40 
3.2 Entrepreneurial activity during recession and recovery ............................................... 43 
3.3 Outlook for enterprise .................................................................................................. 47 
4. Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 49 
4.1 Policy discussions within the UK ................................................................................. 50 
4.2 Infrastructure development during recession and recovery......................................... 55 
4.3 Looking ahead ............................................................................................................. 56 
5. Competition ....................................................................................................................... 59 
5.1 Policy discussions within the UK ................................................................................. 60 
5.2 Competition during recession and recovery ................................................................ 63 
6. Skills ................................................................................................................................... 66 
6.1 Policy discussion within the UK ................................................................................... 66 
6.2 Skill development through recession and recovery ..................................................... 70 
6.3 Outlook for skills .......................................................................................................... 73 
7. Business Investment ........................................................................................................ 75 
7.1 Business investment during recession and recovery................................................... 76 
7.2 Outlook for Business Investment ................................................................................. 77 
ii 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
8. Innovation .......................................................................................................................... 78 
8.1 Policy discussion in the UK ......................................................................................... 79 
8.2 Innovation during Recession and Recovery ................................................................ 83 
8.3 Outlook for innovation.................................................................................................. 85 
9. Outlook for productivity growth in recovery .................................................................. 87 
References ................................................................................................................................. 89 
BIS Economics Papers ............................................................................................................. 98 
 
 iii 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Tables 
Table 1: Decomposition of TFP growth for US manufacturing industries ...................... 10 
Table 2: Decomposition of labour productivity for US and UK manufacturing industries 
(per cent) ....................................................................................................................... 11 
Table 3:  Contribution of ICT, Non-ICT and dwellings to capital deepening .................. 20 
Table 4:  Impact of ICT capital on labour productivity.................................................... 22 
Table 5: Percentage of UK nascent entrepreneurs who sought and were refused 
finance, by type of funding refused................................................................................ 44 
Table 6: OECD progress report on infrastructure development..................................... 54 
Table 7: High priority skills............................................................................................. 69 
Table 8: Business priorities for educational institutions ................................................. 70 
Table 9: Impact of economic climate on business plans for skills investment (%) ......... 72 
Table 10: Innovation in the UK 2002-2004 (%).............................................................. 80 
Figures 
Figure 1: Cyclicality of labour productivity and TFP in the UK ......................................... 5 
Figure 2: Cyclicality of labour productivity and TFP in the USA....................................... 6 
Figure 3: Models of firm-level technical progress .......................................................... 15 
Figure 4: Growth of GDP and Business Investment ...................................................... 19 
Figure 5:  ICT investment growth and GDP growth in the US........................................ 23 
Figure 6: Determinants of productivity ........................................................................... 38 
Figure 7: Early-stage entrepreneurial activity (as % of working age population) ........... 41 
Figure 8: Experts’ view on entrepreneurial conditions in UK and USA .......................... 42 
iv 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 v 
Figure 9: Credit availability of SMEs (change over previous month) ............................. 45 
Figure 10: New business banking relationships............................................................. 46 
Figure 11: Insolvencies.................................................................................................. 47 
Figure 12: Infrastructure quality in the UK relative to large G7 economies.................... 51 
Figure 13: Annual average of public investment/GDP in EU-15 countries (1997-2008) 52 
Figure 14: Cost to business of transport infrastructure problems .................................. 53 
Figure 15: Problems experienced as a result of poor infrastructure: Transport vs. digital 
communications............................................................................................................. 57 
Figure 16: Competition regime performance index........................................................ 61 
Figure 17: Goods market efficiency ............................................................................... 61 
Figure 18: Labour market efficiency .............................................................................. 62 
Figure 19: Bank rate, money market rates and mortgage rate ...................................... 64 
Figure 20: Mergers and acquisitions in the UK.............................................................. 65 
Figure 21: Profile of skill-shortage vacancies across sectors ........................................ 68 
Figure 22: Trends in education ...................................................................................... 71 
Figure 23: Apprenticeships starts and achieved ............................................................ 73 
Figure 24: Business investment during past and most recent recessions and recoveries
...................................................................................................................................... 76 
Figure 25: Quarterly net lending flows (by UK MFIs) ..................................................... 77 
Figure 26: Innovation across sectors............................................................................. 81 
Figure 27: Business enterprise R&D across regions ..................................................... 82 
Figure 28: Trends in R&D and intangible investments................................................... 84 
Figure 29: Innovation during the recession.................................................................... 85 
 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 
Acknowledgments 
The author is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for financial 
support. He is also grateful to economists at the UK Department of Business Innovation 
and Skills (BIS) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) for their support. He thanks, in particular, Paul Crawford, Agnès Estibals, 
Stephanie Dales and Sarika Gupta for their feedback, and Dominic Scott for his help 
with the manuscript. He also thanks Jonathan Haskel for helpful discussions about 
certain issues. 
vi 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 vii 
Foreword 
Productivity is fundamental to sustainable economic growth 
and the prosperity of UK citizens. However, the measurement 
of productivity, and the interpretation of statistics relating to 
productivity, is necessarily imperfect. It is particularly
challenging in the context of an economic downturn and
subsequent recovery. Therefore, understanding the dynamics 
of productivity in the economic cycle is instrumental if we are 
to draw the right policy conclusions for the future. 
In this context, it is instructive to return to the academic 
literature on the cyclical nature of productivity, to ensure
lessons from studies of the UK and internationally are
learned, and to consider the likely prospects for UK
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the 2008-2009 recession on productivity and the prospects for recovery, focusing on key 
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Executive Summary 
The first part of this paper reviews the literature on the cyclical nature of productivity, 
while the second considers the impact of the recent recession on productivity and 
considers the outlook for recovery. Accordingly, the executive summary, below, is 
presented in two parts. 
Part 1 – A Review of the Literature 
Productivity is a key determinant of output growth. While estimates vary, it has been 
argued that variance in the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) can account for 
as much as two-thirds of cross-country variance in GDP growth. It is therefore 
important to understand the sources of productivity growth at the aggregate and firm 
(or micro) levels. 
It is also important to understand the behaviour of productivity over economic cycles. 
Economic downturns, when the opportunity cost of resources is low, provide 
opportunities for firms to implement changes that could raise the trend level of 
productivity in the long run. Downturns also coincide with Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” that can improve average productivity.  
In this section of the paper, we discuss the literature on three related issues: 
 the evidence about the cyclicality of productivity at the aggregate level, and 
explanations of this cyclicality; 
 the evidence about the sources of productivity growth at the aggregate level; 
and 
 the micro evidence about the determinants of firm-level productivity, and the 
cyclicality of these determinants 
The evidence about the cyclicality of productivity at the aggregate level 
suggests that productivity is pro-cyclical. The macro literature discusses three 
plausible explanations of this cyclicality. First, it is argued that GDP growth and 
productivity growth move together because they are both driven by technology 
shocks. The second hypothesis suggests that the observed pro-cyclicality is an 
outcome of a measurement error. If unobserved employee effort rather than 
employee numbers is adjusted over a business cycle, with employees putting in less 
effort during downturns and more effort during upturns, measures of productivity that 
do not control for the time-varying effort would necessarily be pro-cyclical. Finally, it 
is suggested that the production process is subject to economies of scale such that 
productivity would rise during upturns and decline during downturns. 
The first of these explanations is heavily discounted. It has been observed, for 
example, that productivity was pro-cyclical even during the interwar period during 
which major technology shocks were unlikely. Empirical analyses suggest that the 
explanation involving the differences in effort levels over a business cycle is more 
viii 
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plausible of the other two, even though there is some evidence of economies of scale 
as well. 
The micro or firm- (or plant) level literature on pro-cyclicality of productivity is very 
limited. Baily et al1use plant level data from the United States to examine the three 
aforementioned hypotheses, as well as the possibility that the reduction in aggregate 
productivity during downturns can be attributed to a “productivity penalty” that is paid 
by permanently downsizing firms (firms that downsize during recession, and do not 
expand in the upturn). They conclude that the pro-cyclicality of productivity is much 
more likely to be an outcome of this productivity penalty than of the other reasons 
including variation of effort over a business cycle. Productivity of plants that grow in 
the long run is not strongly cyclical, and hence these plants play a limited role in 
driving the cyclicality of productivity. The literature on the (limited) plant level 
evidence and the industry level evidence are, therefore, at odds with each other: one 
explanation emphasises labour hoarding as a driver of pro-cyclicality while the other 
emphasises permanently downsizing firms. 
In order to identify the sources of productivity growth at the aggregate level, a 
number of studies have decomposed productivity growth over time into its 
components, namely, the impact of within firm changes, the impact of reallocation of 
resources among firms, and the impact of net entry that is associated with creative 
destruction. The evidence is somewhat mixed, with some studies attributing as much 
as 50 percent of productivity growth to net entry while others attributing half as much. 
However, two important conclusions can be drawn from the range of studies: (a) both 
net entry and within firm strategies account for a significant proportion of productivity 
growth, (b) the relative importance of net entry is greater during downturns while that 
of within firm changes is greater during upturns. In other words, development of 
institutional structures that facilitate exit of firms with low productivity is an important 
component of the portfolio of policies aimed at increasing productivity growth, but it is 
equally important to focus on policies that facilitate appropriate within firm changes. 
Finally, empirical studies have identified determinants of firm-level productivity. 
One strand of the literature focuses on high level determinants of firm level 
productivity such as competitive pressures on firms and the incentive of their 
managers to adopt productivity-augmenting practices. This strand of the literature 
suggests the following: 
 Competitive pressures can induce firms to take actions that lead to 
productivity growth. However, recent evidence suggests that a firm 
experiencing competition would adopt productivity-augmenting measures only 
if it is already close to the productivity frontier, such that it is relatively easy for 
it to affect the changes that are necessary to raise its productivity levels vis-à-
vis its competitors.  
                                            
 
1 Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwnager 2001 
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 There is some evidence to suggest that firms are likely to adopt strategies that 
increase productivity (and improve other measures of firm performance) if 
there is alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, and if the 
managers are subjected to effective monitoring from creditors and other 
stakeholders. But overall the implications of ownership structures for 
managerial ability and productivity growth are ill defined. 
A second strand of the literature focuses on the impact of specific firm characteristics 
and actions such as investment in innovation and human capital of the employees on 
firm level productivity. This strand of the literature suggests that: 
o Innovation is an important determinant of firm-level productivity (and its 
growth). Even though innovation potentially includes a wide range of 
activities, in the academic literature it is generally synonymous with 
research and development (R&D). 
o Business investment too is a determinant of productivity growth. New 
capital embodies technical progress, and evidence suggests that 
productivity growth is much more likely to be driven by use of new 
technology than by creation of new technology. 
o Finally, productivity growth at the firm level is significantly correlated with 
the human capital of the employees. 
The literature on determinants of firm level productivity itself does not discuss the 
cyclicality of these determinants. For some of these determinants, such as 
competition and ownership structure, there is no separate (and conclusive) evidence 
about changes over economic cycles. Nor does economic theory have any obvious 
implications for the cyclicality of competitive pressures and managerial ability. 
However, there is empirical evidence about the cyclicality of the other determinants 
discussed above: 
 R&D expenditure is generally pro-cyclical. However, the less tangible and 
hence difficult to measure aspects of innovation might be pro-cyclical.  
 Business investment is pro-cyclical in OECD countries, and there is evidence 
to suggest that this is on account of pro-cyclicality of available credit and 
internal resources. While there is little specific evidence about the cyclicality of 
investment in ICT capital, which may have contributed to as much as three-
quarters of the growth in labour productivity during the 1995-2002 period, it is 
reasonable to infer that this type of business investment would also be pro-
cyclical. 
 The evidence about the cyclicality of investment in human capital is somewhat 
mixed. Enrolment in schools and universities is countercyclical in developed 
countries. On the other hand, recruitment of trainees and apprentices is 
generally pro-cyclical. Finally, there is mixed evidence about the cyclicality of 
investment in employee training. 
 
x 
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Part 2 – Impact of the 2008-2009 Recession on Productivity and 
Recovery in the UK 
Policy discussions about determinants of productivity often revolve around factors 
that are functionally separable. Some of these factors such as investment are 
inherently cyclical in nature, while others such as infrastructure and competition are 
structural factors that have a long run relationship with productivity and its growth.  
 
An examination of the functional factors that affect productivity and its growth in the 
UK suggest the following: 
 
 The level of enterprise in the UK is comparable to those in other G7 
countries, and is largely opportunity driven, but it is significantly lower than that 
in the USA. Key structural factors that adversely affect the enterprise level in 
the UK, especially as compared with the USA, are cultural inhibitions about 
starting a business, and low levels of innovation and low growth ambitions 
subsequent to starting a business. Entrepreneurial activity is also affected by 
cyclical factors, namely, the recent financial crisis and recession. The 2009 
Global Enterprise Monitor survey documented a steep increase in the 
proportion of entrepreneurs who sought and were refused finance by banks 
and other sources. However, the difficulty in accessing financial resources 
notwithstanding, product market entry was not significantly affected in 2009, 
during the height of the recession. In the long run, the key to improving the 
enterprise level in the UK may lie less in cyclical factors and more in the 
government’s ability to address the aforementioned structural problems. 
 
 The UK lags behind comparable industrialised economies such as France, 
Germany, Japan and the USA with respect to the quality of its physical 
infrastructure. The genesis of this weakness can perhaps be traced back to 
the relatively low levels of investment in physical. Business organisations such 
as the Confederation of British Industries have noted the adverse impact of 
lacking quality and reliability of infrastructural facilities, notably in the transport 
sector, on the productivity of UK businesses. Since the publication of the 
Eddington Study of 2006, the government has addressed some of the 
structural problems associated with infrastructural development in the UK. 
However, while progress has been made, a 2009 review published by the 
OECD makes a persuasive case for further action. In light of the Spending 
Review of 2010, it is reasonable to assume that in the foreseeable future the 
government will have to play a limited role in infrastructure development. 
Indeed the National Infrastructure Report 2010 suggests that, in the future, the 
private sector would have to play a significant role in developing infrastructure 
in the UK, with the government intervening selectively.  
 
 A 2007 survey undertaken by KPMG suggests that the UK’s competition 
regime compares favourably with those of the USA and the EU countries. It 
has narrowed the gap with the German and American regimes, and 
consistently performs better than the EU average. In part, the narrowing of the 
gap vis-a-vis the USA can be attributed to an improvement in the capability of 
the UK’s regulators to rigorously analyse available information. This view is 
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also reflected in the indices of product and labour market efficiencies 
published in various issues of the Global Competitiveness Report published by 
the World Economic Forum. 
 
 The Leitch Review of 2006 argue that UK has historically had a skills gap vis-
a-vis other OECD countries, and this gap has not been bridged despite the 
significant improvement in the skills level in the UK between the early nineties 
and the middle of the last decade. Available evidence suggests that there are 
two problems in particular, namely, a mismatch between the skills of the 
workers and the skills required for their jobs, and heterogeneity about 
perceived benefits from skills acquisition. The skills gap is also reflected in the 
greater perceived difficulty of British businesses to recruit workers with 
appropriate skills, as reflected in a recent survey undertaken by the British 
Chamber of Commerce, and their consequent reliance on training. The 2008-
09 recession and its aftermath has witnessed a sharp increase in the demand 
for university places. Government action may have also prevented a shift 
away from the upward trend in the number of apprenticeships. But there was a 
modest negative impact on training. In the long run, the challenge for UK’s 
policy makers is to foster higher levels of skills that are essential for 
emergence as a leading knowledge-based economy, as well as progression of 
a significant proportion of the population beyond the first university degree. 
 
 Not surprisingly, especially given that the 2008-09 recession was precipitated 
by a financial crisis, aggregate business investment decreased sharply from 
the end of 2008, and the rate of decline of business investment was far more 
rapid during this recession than during the recessions of the eighties and the 
nineties. This is consistent with data that suggest that net disbursal of credit to 
major sectors of the UK economy, such as manufacturing, real estate, 
construction and wholesale and retail trade, has been persistently negative 
since Q2 of 2009. Academic research suggests that recovery in flow of credit 
to UK businesses, and the corresponding increase in business investment, 
may take time. In part, this would be on account of heightened wariness 
among banks about borrower quality and the likelihood of adverse selection, 
and in part on account of continuing wariness among businesses about 
investment in new and existing projects. 
 
 Innovation has traditionally been measured using R&D expenditures. 
However, evidence suggests that conventional R&D is undertaken by a 
minority of firms. Incidence of R&D is particularly low among small and 
medium enterprises. As a consequence, it is important to take into 
consideration wider innovation that includes, for example, improvement in 
product design and organisational restructuring. Evidence suggests that in the 
UK incidence of both product and process innovation and wider innovation are 
lower than in Germany, one of the countries that continues to maintain a 
productivity gap vis-a-vis the UK. There is also considerable regional 
heterogeneity in the incidence and depth of innovative activities within the UK. 
Emerging evidence suggests that there is scope for optimism about the extent 
of innovation in the UK during the recession. Longer term challenges for policy 
xii 
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makers lie in structural issues such as greater cooperation between creators 
of knowledge such as universities and users of knowledge such as 
businesses, and development of infrastructure such as high speed broadband 
and a property rights system that facilitate such cooperation. 
 
The most important conceptual challenge for policy makers is to understand that 
these factors are inter-related, and indeed are part of a system. An important 
implication of this systemic view of the determinants of productivity is that, while 
pursuing productivity growth, it is difficult to substitute any one of these drivers with 
one or more of the others, i.e., they are complements. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Solow’s path breaking contribution to the discussion about economic growth, 
technical progress is viewed as the cornerstone of sustained growth.2 The 
importance of technical progress is particularly high for mature industrialised 
countries for which there is not much scope to grow by adding more factor inputs and 
by reallocating factor inputs across sectors.3 Productivity, in turn, is the widely used 
proxy for technical progress.  
There is much disagreement about the measurement of productivity. Total factor 
productivity (TFP), which is conceptually closer to the concept of technical progress 
captured in a Solow-vian production relationship than labour productivity, is 
notoriously difficult to measure. The genesis of the problem lies in the difficulty in 
measuring factor inputs like capital and labour accurately. Consequently, labour 
productivity is often used as the proxy for productivity. But growth in labour 
productivity does not necessarily reflect technical progress,4  and hence estimation of 
TFP and identification of its determinants remains a major endeavour in both 
academic and policy circles. 
Empirical evidence suggests that TFP growth accounts for a fairly large proportion of 
the growth among “western” industrialised countries, including the United Kingdom 
and the United States. While some studies suggest that TFP growth may have 
contributed to as much as 90 percent of growth of domestic output in the countries 
like the United States, analyses that use long time series data suggest that the 
contribution of TFP growth is a more modest yet fairly substantial 25 percent.5 
Further, cross-country analyses suggest that variance in TFP growth accounts for 
more than two-thirds of the variance in output growth across countries.  
The long term trend in TFP growth depends on how firms and individuals make use 
of the opportunity to undertake activities such as innovation and investment in human 
capital at times when the opportunity cost of using labour power and other resources 
for such endeavours is low, i.e., during periods of economic slowdown.6 This makes 
it imperative to better understand how productivity and, more importantly, firm-level 
activities and environmental factors that drive it behave over a business cycle. In 
particular, in order to be able to better target productivity growth with policy initiatives 
over a business cycle, it is important to differentiate between the factors that facilitate 
growth in aggregate productivity during periods of economic slowdown (or 
recessions) and periods of rapid economic growth. 
                                            
 
2 Solow 1956 
3 Harrod 1939, Domar 1946, Lewis 1954, Ranis and Fei 1961 
4 See Box 1 for details. 
5 Baier et al. 2002 
6 Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998 
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In this paper, therefore, we examine the cyclicality of productivity, and the factors that 
are generally accepted as contributors to this growth. In Section 2, we discuss the 
evidence about, and the explanations for, the cyclicality of productivity. In Section 3, 
we discuss the evidence about the relative contributions of within-firm changes and 
market forces to productivity growth. In Section 4, we discuss the cyclicality of 
specific firm-level strategies like innovation and environmental factors like 
competition that contribute to productivity growth. In Section 5, we report the 
conclusions drawn from the discussion in the rest of the paper. 
Box 1: Measures of productivity 
In the economics literature, two measures of productivity are generally used: 
average labour productivity (ALP) and total factor productivity (TFP).  
 
ALP is usually measured as gross output per worker or gross output per hour of 
work. On occasions, it is also measured as value added per worker or value 
added per hour of work. While this measure of productivity is relatively easy to 
estimate and interpret, it has an important shortcoming. It embodies changes in 
both capital inputs and technological progress. When measured as gross output 
per worker (or work hour), it also embodies changes in factor inputs. ALP, 
therefore, is a partial measure that could be misrepresented as technical 
progress or productivity of workers. 
 
TFP (sometimes also called multifactor productivity or MFP) attempts to harness 
the impact of pure technical progress and is measured as the part of gross 
output or value added that cannot be explained by factor inputs such as labour 
and capital. Consider a production function with Hicks neutral technology 
 
        [1.1] 
 
TFP can then be defined as pure technical progress 
 
        [1.2] 
 
Since it is not easy to measure TFP using equation 1.2, it is customary to 
measure TFP growth instead. Under assumptions of constant returns to scale, 
equation 1.1 can be transformed into 
 
t
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Box 1: Measures of productivity 
where sL and sK are the shares of labour and capital, respectively, in the output 
(sL +  sK = 1), and , ,  and  are the growth rates of the relevant 
variables. From equation 1.3, growth in TFP can be estimated as 
tY tA tL tK
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       [1.4] 
 
While TFP growth is a more meaningful measure of productivity than ALP, its 
measurement is affected by two important factors. First, one has to control for 
changes in the quality of factor input across the two points in time across which 
the growth rate is computed. Second, one has to control for the actual level of 
effort of the workers, effort levels being potentially variable across business 
cycles. In addition, econometricians argue that factor inputs might not be 
exogenously given for a relatively long time period (e.g., a year) and might be 
adjusted in response to signals about productivity. Nevertheless, despite these 
challenges, equation 1.4 remains a popular (the so-called “growth accounting”) 
way of measuring TFP growth. 
 
Using equation 1.3, it is easy to link the two measures of productivity. 
Specifically, we get 
 

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In other words, growth in labour productivity is explained in part by growth in TFP 
and in part by capital deepening, i.e., an increase in the amount of capital per 
worker. 
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2. Pro-cyclicality of productivity 
growth 
 
Productivity is pro-cyclical. This is essentially an outcome of labour hoarding, 
as employees reduce or increase their effort as the demand for output falls or 
increases, combined with economies of scale that arise during periods of 
economic boom. 
 
Macroeconomists agree that productivity is pro-cyclical (with the notable exception of 
2006-2008 in the United States).7 This is evident from Figure 1 and Figure 2 in which 
growth rates for ALP and TFP are plotted against GDP growth rates in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, respectively. 
Figure 1: Cyclicality of labour productivity and TFP in the UK 
 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
 
                                            
 
7 Gordon (2004) notes that productivity in the United States rose sharply at the turn of the century, 
even as the economy slowed down on account of a number of negative shocks. He attributes this to a 
lagged (or continuing) impact of the surge in ICT investment in the USA in the nineties. 
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Figure 2: Cyclicality of labour productivity and TFP in the USA 
 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
 
2.1  Hypotheses for observed pro-cyclicality 
Hypothesis 1: Dependence of both productivity and GDP growth on exogenous 
productivity shock 
Proponents of real business cycle (RBC) theory have argued that this pro-cyclicality 
of productivity results from the fact both GDP growth and productivity growth have 
their genesis in the same thing, namely, exogenous technology shocks. Despite 
some support,8 this view is generally discounted. It has been demonstrated, for 
example, that productivity growth was pro-cyclical even during the interwar period 
even though significant technology shocks were unlikely during the Depression era.9 
Hypothesis 2: Labour hoarding 
A more commonly held view is that the pro-cyclicality is an outcome of labour 
hoarding.10 Firms do not downsize as rapidly as the decline in their output (or output 
growth) during periods of economic slowdown. Employees merely reduce their effort 
as the demand for output falls. This results in both lower ALP and TFP during such 
periods. As the economy expands rapidly once more, in a period of economic boom, 
the employees increase their effort to meet greater output demand, and ALP and 
TFP rise once again. 
                                            
 
8 Basu 1996 
9 Bernanke and Parkinson 1991 
10 Solow 1964, Rosen 1968 
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Hypothesis 3: Economies of scale in production 
Another view is that there are economies of scale in production.11 They could be 
intrinsic to firms, but they could also arise on account of spill-over effects of 
aggregate industry- or economy-wide output.12 These economies are realised during 
periods of economic boom, when output expands rapidly, and hence productivity 
rises during years of economic boom and declines during years of economic 
slowdown. 
2.2 Implications of the hypotheses 
To recapitulate, the methodological basis for all empirical analyses of productivity 
and productivity growth is the neoclassical production function which posits that 
output is a function of factor inputs – labour and capital – and technical progress. 
The implication of the labour hoarding view is that we measure labour incorrectly. 
While we observe the number of employees and the number of work hours, we do 
not observe the effort of the employees which change according to the phase of the 
business cycle. According to this view, therefore, the standard neoclassical 
production function is mis-specified. A correct specification of a production function 
should include some measure or (or proxy for) effort which varies over a business 
cycle. 
The implication of the economies of scale view is that the production function is 
correctly specified if these economies are intrinsic to a firm. But the estimated impact 
of factor inputs would be higher for aggregated data – say, for the entire 
manufacturing sector – than for disaggregated data – say, for individual industries. If, 
however, the source of the economies of scale is external to a firm, then the 
specification for a production function should also include some measure of 
aggregate output. 
2.3 Evidence from empirical analyses 
Scholars who have extended their specification for the neoclassical production 
function to include proxies of effort have generally found that the impact of proxies of 
work effort – which varies over a business cycle – on output is statistically 
significant.13 Examples of proxies include ratio of non-production worker to total 
production14 and accident rates15. They have interpreted these results as evidence 
favouring the labour hoarding view. 
                                            
 
11 Hall 1988, 1991 
12 Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989 
13 Rotemberg and Summers 1990, Bernanke and Parkinson 1991, Caballero and Lyons 1992, 
Sbordone 1997 
14 Rotemberg and Summers argue that employment of non-production workers vary much less than 
that of production workers, and hence there is greater labour hoarding in industries with a higher 
proportion of non-production workers. 
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However, the economies of scale view cannot be ruled out altogether. To begin with, 
empirical results suggest that variations in factor inputs and proxies of work effort do 
not explain all of the variation in output. Hence, factors other than labour hoarding 
may be at work. Further, some scholars have found that estimates of returns to scale 
are indeed much higher for aggregate manufacturing sector than for 2-digit 
industries.16 
2.4 Evidence from micro data 
Almost all empirical analyses of the pro-cyclicality of productivity and productivity 
growth involve the use of industry level data. However, from a policymaking 
perspective it is important to examine behaviour of individual firms because policies 
are generally formulated to target firm behaviour. 
In a notable exception, Baily et al.17 find that there is a considerable difference in the 
cyclicality of productivity of firms that permanently downsize during economic 
downturns and those that experience growth in the longer run. Firms that downsize 
permanently experience a “productivity penalty” which is possibly an outcome of 
suboptimal combination of factor inputs during a period of rapid downsizing. By 
contrast, the productivity of firms that experience growth in the longer run does not 
exhibit much pro-cyclicality. Pro-cyclicality of overall productivity, therefore, is driven 
by the productivity penalty of permanently downsizing firms. 
While the Baily et al. explanation is not implausible, the intuition for the penalty is not 
completely clear. Moreover, in the absence of more firm-level evidence, it is not clear 
as to whether this experience in the United States in the eighties is replicated over 
time and across countries. However, the incongruence of the view that the pro-
cyclicality is driven by labour hoarding with the view that it is driven by permanently 
downsizing firms suggests that there is need for further examination of this 
phenomenon using micro or firm-level data. 
                                                                                                                                        
 
15 Caballero and Lyons argue that accident rates are higher when workers put in greater effort. 
16 Caballero and Lyons 1992 
17 Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwnager 2001 
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3. Sources of productivity growth 
 
 Changes both in the composition of firms within industries (net entry) 
and within firms as they restructure, invest in new capital, technology 
and human resources have an impact on aggregate productivity. 
 
 In the USA net entry plays a more important role in productivity growth, 
especially during periods of economic recovery, whereas in the UK 
within firm changes have a much greater impact. 
 
 
Economists generally distinguish between two sets of factors that have an impact on 
aggregate productivity. First, there might be a change in firm level productivity, as 
firms restructure, invest in new capital and technology, and adopt human resources 
policies that increase the average human capital endowment of their work force. 
Second, there might be a change in the composition of firms within industries, e.g., 
as firms with low productivity exit. 
3.1  Net entry explains a significant proportion of productivity 
growth but within-firm factors are possibly more important 
The literature uses algorithms developed by a number of scholars to decompose 
productivity growth into several components.18 The commonly used algorithm 
proposed by Foster et al. decomposes aggregate productivity growth into the 
following components: (a) growth that is accounted for by restructuring within 
continuing firms or plants (“within plant” component), (b) growth that is accounted for 
by reallocation of resources among continuing firms or plant (“between plant” 
component) , (c) growth that is accounted for by entry of new firms (which may or 
may not be more productive than incumbent firms), and (d) growth that is accounted 
for by exit of existing firms (which presumably have lower levels of productivity than 
incumbent firms). Often, the impact of entry and exit are combined in the form of the 
“net entry” component of productivity growth.19 
We are particularly interested in the relative importance of the contribution of within-
firm changes and net entry for productivity growth. 
Evidence from the United States, obtained from plant-level data, for the 1977-1987 
periods, is reported in Table 1. Of these, 1977-1982 was a period of economic 
slowdown, while 1982-1987 was a period of rapid economic growth. Consistent with 
                                            
 
18 Griliches and Regev 1995, Olley and Pakes 1996, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 1998 
19 In addition, there is a “cross” component of productivity growth, which captures the covariance effect 
that is positive when there an increase in the market share of firms that experience growth in 
productivity. 
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the evidence about the pro-cyclicality of productivity, TFP growth was 2.7 percent 
during the former period, and 7.32 percent during the latter period. 
Table 1: Decomposition of TFP growth for US manufacturing industries 
  Decomposition of TFP growth 
  Total 
growth 
Within-plant 
share (%) 
Between-
plant share 
(%) 
Cross-plant 
share (%) 
Net entry 
share (%) 
1977 - 82 2.7 -9 -33 116 25
1982 - 87 7.32 52 -18 51 14
Source: Bartelsman and Doms (2001): Table 1 (pp. 584) 
The results reported in the table suggests that during the 1977-1982 period, within-
plant changes were such that productivity growth was reduced by 9 percent on their 
account.20 However, net entry during that period accounted for 25 percent of the 
growth of TFP. During the 1982-1987 period, by contrast, within-plant changes 
accounted for 52 percent of the growth in TFP, while net entry accounted for 14 
percent of this growth. 
This suggests two things: First, it suggests that net entry is a bigger determinant of 
aggregate productivity growth during periods of economic slowdown. This is 
consistent with the Schumpeterian view that periods of economic slowdown have a 
“cleansing effect” on aggregate productivity by way of firm exit.21 Second, it suggests 
that during periods of rapid economic growth the within-firm factors play a much 
bigger role in boosting productivity (and productivity growth) than net entry. 
More recent evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States, albeit about 
labour productivity, are reported in Table 2. Of the two time periods, 1987-1992 was 
a period of economic slowdown, while 1992-1997 was a period of economic recovery 
and accelerating economic growth. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
20 The sum of the contributions of the various components of productivity growth should add up to 100 
percent. For example, for 1977-1982, -9, -33, 116 and 25 add up to 99. The mild discrepancy is on 
account of rounding off errors. 
21 Campbell 1998 
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Table 2: Decomposition of labour productivity for US and UK manufacturing 
industries (per cent) 
  Decomposition of labour productivity growth 
  Total 
growth (%) 
Within (%) Between 
(%) 
Cross (%) Net entry 
(%) 
United Kingdom 
1987–92 2.7 63 22 -11 26
1992-97 3.3 83 0 -11 28
United States 
1987–92 1.8 90 26 -36 21
1992-97 3.1 97 7 -21 17
Source: Barnes, Haskel and Maliranta (2002) 
The evidence suggests that, in the United States, net entry did indeed play a more 
important role in determining labour productivity growth during a period of economic 
recovery and accelerating growth than during a period of economic slump. However, 
that was not the case in the United Kingdom. Further, in both these countries, within-
firm changes had a much greater, and positive, impact on labour productivity growth, 
during both the time periods. 
Scarpetta et al.22 use an alternative decomposition methodology, proposed by 
Griliches and Regev, to decompose labour productivity growth across OECD 
countries into its various components. Their study also finds that in the United 
Kingdom the impact of net entry on productivity growth was relatively small across a 
number of 2- and 3-digit industries. 
3.2  Explaining the relatively smaller impact of net entry: 
institutional rigidities and firm characteristics  
A plausible explanation for the relatively small contribution of net entry to productivity 
growth, measured in terms of either labour productivity or TFP, is that structural 
rigidities and institutional weaknesses prevent reallocation of productive resources 
from exiting firms to (presumably more productive) incumbent firms or new 
entrants.23 The study by Scarpetta et al. confirms the negative impact of regulatory 
barriers to market entry on TFP growth. 
                                            
 
22 Scarpetta et al. 2002 
23 Caballero and Hammour (1996, 2000) discuss these rigidities and weaknesses in general terms. 
However, the nature of such rigidities is easy to comprehend. For example, if inability to mitigate credit 
risk makes banks risk averse, such that they are more willing to lend to financially solvent incumbents 
that do not experience rapid productivity growth than to risky new entrants that are at the cutting edge 
of innovation, the impact of entry on productivity growth would be limited.  
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Another explanation is that the extent of contribution of net entry to productivity 
growth depends on the distribution of single-plant and multi-plant firms in an 
economy. Disney et al.24 find that, between 1980 and 1992, single-plant firms did not 
experience any productivity growth. Multi-plant firms accounted for all the observed 
productivity gain, and the impact of net entry on productivity growth was due to the 
closure and opening of plants by these multi-plant firms. 
                                            
 
24 Disney, Haskel and Yeden 2003 
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Box 2: Decomposing productivity growth into its components 
Economists use a variety of decomposition algorithms to better understand the drivers of 
changes in productivity. Two commonly used decomposition algorithms are attributed to 
Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998). 
 
Griliches and Regev (1995) 
 
Griliches and Regev propose that change in overall productivity for an industry can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 
          exit
Xi
iikti
entry
Ni
iitit
between
Ci
iiit
within
Ci
itit PpPpPppP 



 ,
  [2.1] 
 
where  indicates change,  is the market share of firm j in the industry, pi is the 
productivity of firm i and P is the aggregate (i.e. weighted average) productivity level of 
the industry, the change in productivity is measured over the (t-k, t) time horizon, C is 
the set of all firms that remain in the industry over this entire period, N is the set of all 
firms that enter the industry in period t, and X is the set of all firms that exit the industry 
at the end of period t. The within component captures the (market-share weighted) 
impact of changes (or growth) in the productivity of continuing firms on industry-level 
productivity. The between component captures the impact of reallocation of resources 
(and hence changes in market share) between more productive and less productive 
firms. The entry component captures the impact of market entry by (presumably more 
productive) firms. Finally, the exit component accounts for the impact of exit by 
(presumably less productive) firms. 
 
 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) 
 
Foster et al. take into account the impact of entry and exit and decompose change in 
industry-level productivity as follows: 
 
            Exit
Xj
ktktjktj
Entry
Nj
ktjtjt
Cross
Cj
jtjt
Between
Cj
ktktjjt
Within
Cj
itktit PPPPPPPPP 







  ,,,,  
 
         [2.2] 
where, as in the Griliches-Regev methodology,  indicates change,  is the market 
share of firm j in the industry, the change in productivity is measured over the (t-k, t) time 
horizon, C is the set of all firms that remain in the industry over this entire period, N is 
the set of all firms that enter the industry in period t, and X is the set of all firms that exit 
the industry at the end of period t.  The within, between, entry and exit effects too have 
the same interpretations as in the Griliches-Regev model. Additionally, however, the 
cross component accounts for the covariance effect that is positive when there is market 
share growth for firms that experience growth in productivity. 
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4. Within-firm versus external 
determinants of productivity 
 
 Productivity is positively correlated with competitive pressures. This 
positive correlation is especially strong for firms that are close to the 
technology frontier or in sectors with small average establishment size; 
in other cases competition can have a negative impact  
 
 It is difficult to predict the cyclicality of innovation as greater access to 
credit supports innovation during periods of economic growth, but firms 
also may reallocate resources to prepare for subsequent recovery 
during periods of downturn. However, private R & D expenditure tends 
to be pro-cyclical 
 
 Aggregate business investment is pro-cyclical and more volatile than 
output. There is no simple relationship between total business 
investment as a share of GDP and GDP growth, as the quality of 
business investment and other forms of investment such as intangible 
investment play a role 
 
 Investment in ICT capital has made a significant contribution to 
productivity over the previous period of expansion and there is some 
evidence that it might be pro-cyclical 
 
 Although economic theory suggests that individuals' investment in 
human capital should be countercyclical, empirical evidence suggests 
pro-cyclicality of training, in particular apprenticeships. There is mixed 
evidence on the cyclicality of training of existing employees 
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Academic research generally models firm-level technical progress in one of two 
ways. It can be modelled as an outcome of competitive pressures and the skills of 
the managers who respond to these pressures. Alternatively, it can be modelled as 
an outcome of specific firm-level strategies like innovation and investment in human 
capital of employees. The relationship between the two alternatives is outlined in 
Figure 3.25 
Figure 3: Models of firm-level technical progress 
 
4.1 Competition, managerial skill and their cyclicality  
There is a fairly large literature that suggests that productivity (and productivity 
growth), which results from technical progress, is generally positively correlated with 
competitive pressures.26 However, a more careful examination of the relationship 
suggests that there are many caveats. For example, it has been found that in OECD 
countries competition has a positive impact on labour productivity in ‘fragmented’ 
industries (sectors with small average establishment size) but the impact is negative 
in ‘segmented’ markets (sectors characterised by existence of large establishments, 
covering a large proportion of employment and output).27 This is perhaps not 
surprising. If an industry is fragmented, and the scope for product differentiation is 
limited, then the competition is expected to provide firms with an incentive to improve 
their productivity. On the other hand, if productivity in segmented markets is driven 
largely by investment in technology embedded in capital and R&D, and competition 
                                            
 
25 Bartelsman and Doms (2000) argue that while such studies identify factors that have statistically 
significant impact on plant-level productivity (or productivity growth), these factors typically do not 
explain a significant proportion of the inter-plant variation in productivity. They suggest that this is 
perhaps not surprising, given that, as argued by Griliches and Mairesse (1983), the production 
function approach to measuring productivity does not fully capture the complexities of the production 
process within plants. 
26 Caves and Barton 1990, Green and Mayes 1991, Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall 1992, Nickell 1996 
27 Pilat 1996. These definitions are based on a typology of market structure outlined in Oliveira 
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat, 1997. 
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either reduces the incentive to make these investments or the ability to make these 
investments, as strategic considerations (e.g., advertisement, acquisitions, etc) 
crowd out the available resources, then productivity might be adversely affected. 
Similarly, competitive pressures might lead to productivity growth in firms that are 
close to the technological frontier, but not in those that are far from it.28 Finally, import 
liberalisation may augment productivity of domestic firms not because of import 
competition in the market for final products but because of competition in the market 
for intermediate inputs.29 
A similarly large literature has attempted to estimate the impact of managerial skills 
and incentives – the usual proxy for which is some measure of the ownership 
structure of the firm – to output and productivity. The popular wisdom in this literature 
is that managerial incentives to adopt appropriate strategies is enhanced through 
private ownership of productive assets, greater alignment between the incentives of 
the managers and the shareholders, and better monitoring by creditors and other 
stakeholders.30 However, the relationships are not necessarily linear, and the proxies 
themselves capture managerial incentives much more than their skills. 
Competitive pressures and ownership structures might also interact with each other. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, competitive pressures have been found to 
increase productivity in widely held firms and in firms with concentrated ownership, 
but not in firms controlled by insiders.31 
More importantly, there is no theoretical basis to predict the cyclicality of competitive 
pressures and managerial skills. Some phenomena like mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) that have impact on – in this case, both – market concentration and incentives 
of managers exhibit cyclicality; M&A is pro-cyclical.32 But the cyclicality of competition 
and managerial skill themselves cannot be ascertained. 
4.2 Within-firm strategies and their cyclicality  
4.2.1 Innovation and pro-cyclicality of R&D expenditure 
Innovation encompasses a wide range of strategies. It includes introduction of new 
products and processes, changes in business models, and research and 
development (R&D). However, since some aspects of innovation like new process 
are difficult to measure, and since data for some other aspects of innovation are not 
readily available, academic research generally uses R&D (and patents) as the proxy 
                                            
 
28 Aghion et al. 2004, 2009. In the latter paper for instance the authors provide evidence of a causal 
effect as predicted by Schumpeterian growth theory that the threat of technologically advanced entry 
spurs innovation incentives in sectors close to the technology frontier, where successful innovation 
allows incumbents to survive the threat, but discourages innovation in laggard sectors, where the 
threat reduces incumbents’ expected rents from innovating. 
29 Amiti and Konings 2007 
30 See Djankov and Murrell 2002, Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010 
31 Koke and Renneboog 2003 
32 Komlenovic et al. 2009 
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for innovation. Since R&D accounts for over half of innovation-related expenditures,33 
and certainly provides a key input into the innovation process,34 this is a reasonable 
approximation. 
There is a broad agreement about the positive impact of R&D (or knowledge capital) 
on productivity.35 Gains from R&D increase with time and are likely to be much 
greater in the long run than in the short run.36 Even though R&D is undertaken by a 
relatively small fraction of firms, evidence suggests that firms benefit from the use of 
innovations37 such that the aggregate level of R&D in an economy has implications 
for firm-level productivity.38  
From a theoretical point of view, it is difficult to predict the cyclicality of R&D 
expenditure.39 On the one hand, greater access to credit and larger internal 
resources might make it easier to incur R&D expenditure during periods of rapid 
economic growth. On the other hand, periods of economic downturn reduce the 
opportunity cost of a firm’s resources and these resources can therefore be used for 
R&D to prepare the firm better for the subsequent recovery. There is some evidence 
to suggest that firms may indeed reallocate resources to R&D during recessions.40 
Overall, however, aggregate R&D expenditure is by and large pro-cyclical, with a 
fairly high positive correlation between private sector R&D expenditure and GDP 
growth rate.41 
There are several plausible explanations for this pro-cyclical behaviour of R&D 
expenditure. First, reallocation of human resources to R&D activities may not be 
feasible during periods of economic slowdown if R&D requires specific skills. Indeed, 
the supply of labour that is suitable for R&D might itself be pro-cyclical.42 Second, 
since benefits of R&D might be limited by competitors who imitate new products that 
are generated using R&D, firms might be willing to undertake R&D only during 
periods of strong economic growth when strong demand limits the loss of revenue to 
imitating competitors.43 Finally, greater availability of credit and internal resources 
might make R&D more feasible during periods of strong economic growth.44 
Empirical evidence suggests that at the firm level R&D expenditure is pro-cyclical for 
                                            
 
33 Rammer 2005 
34 Heger 2004 
35 Crepon, Dueget and Mairesse, 1998 
36 Geroski 1991 
37 While it has been argued that even effective use of externally developed innovation requires some 
internal R&D activities (Parisi et al. 2006), evidence suggests that it is not always necessary to be 
R&D active to benefit from technology transfer from the technology leader (Cameron et al. 2005). 
38 Geroski 1991, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2001 
39 Harfi and Mathieu 2009 
40 Bean 1990, Saint-Paul 1991 
41 Barlevy 2006 
42 Fatas 2000 
43 Barlevy 2007 
44 Aghion et al. 2005, Ouyang 2007 
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credit constrained firms, but countercyclical or “Schumpeterian” for firms that do not 
experience such constraints.45 
4.2.2 Pro-cyclicality of business investment 
Investment in physical capital increases labour productivity through capital deepening 
but does not have an impact on TFP per se. However, such investment can also be 
used for procurement of products that embody innovations, for technology transfer 
from innovators. Acquisition of innovative products and new technology has an 
impact on TFP as well. 
Data for G7 countries suggest that aggregate business investment is pro-cyclical 
(and also more volatile than output).46 The Japanese experience, among others, 
indicates that this pro-cyclicality can be explained by greater access to credit and 
larger internal resources during periods of rapid economic growth.47 However, at the 
firm level, pro-cyclicality of business investment is possibly restricted to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), with business investment of larger firms immune to 
temporary demand shocks.48 
Looking in more detail at the relationship between aggregate business investment 
(one of several inputs) and GDP growth (the desired output), a simple correlation of 
the average share of total business investment in GDP across countries over the 
period 1997-2007 against average GDP growth across countries over the same 
period is negative – with countries with lowest average shares of business 
investment in GDP over the period 1997-2007, like the UK and the US, exhibiting the 
strongest GDP growth over the period.  
This suggests that: (a) the quality of business investment, rather than the level of 
business investment per se, has a role to play; (b) other forms of investment, like 
intangible investment, have a role to play; or (c) some combination of both. While the 
official data on business investment do not enable us to say anything definitive about 
the quality of business investment over the last few decades, there is some evidence 
to suggest that the UK compares favourably to other countries on intangible 
investment, and other forms of investment.  
While there appears to be no simple relationship between total business investment 
as a share of GDP and GDP growth, any barriers or constraints that cause 
investment to fall below its efficient level will adversely affect long-term growth. It is 
important, therefore, that we identify potential barriers or constraints on business 
investment and assess, where appropriate, how the government may intervene to 
address these. It is particularly important that we do this now, as the recession may 
                                            
 
45 Aghion et al. 2008, Bovha-Padilla et al. 2009 
46 Fiorito and Kollintzas 1994 
47 Kiyotaki and West 1996 
48 Vermeulen 2000 
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have changed the scale or nature of these barriers and the way in which they impact 
on the economy.  
Figure 4: Growth of GDP and Business Investment 
 
Source: ONS 
4.2.3 Likely pro-cyclicality of investment in ICT capital 
ICT capital is special because it not only embodies technological progress, but also 
has significant spillover effects.49 Adoption of new ICT products facilitates firm-level 
innovation, and standardisation of operational platforms (e.g., Windows and Office) 
that improves efficiency of inter-firm communication and management of productive 
activities. 
Evidence from the United Kingdom, reported in  
Table 3, suggests that the contribution of ICT capital deepening on labour 
productivity growth increased 3-4 fold by the mid nineties. During the 1994-1998 
period, it accounted for nearly half the growth in labour productivity in this country. 
However, even this is possibly an underestimate because ICT capital investment 
must have had an impact on TFP growth as well. 
                                            
 
49 Gordon 2004 
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Table 3:  Contribution of ICT, Non-ICT and dwellings to capital deepening 
  Contribution of capital deepening 
  Growth of 
Y/hour 
ICT Non-ICT Dwellings TFP 
  % p.a. % % % % 
Low software 
1979-89 2.75 13.5 18.6 6 61.9
1989-94 3.01 13.4 27.4 9.1 50.1
1994-98 1.47 43.5 5.5 -0.1 51.1
High software 
1979-89 2.8 15.1 18.3 5.9 60.8
1989-94 3.1 16.3 26.6 8.8 48.3
1994-98 1.55 47.8 5.2 -0.1 47.1
Source: Oulton (2002) 
Evidence from the United States, reported in Table 4, suggests that the impact of ICT 
capital on labour productivity is much higher once the indirect impact through TFP 
growth is taken into account. ICT investment accounted for about 75 percent of the 
growth in labour productivity during the 1995-2002 period over the 1973-1995 period 
(rows 12 and 13 of last column). Of this, about 43 percent50 is a direct outcome of 
investment in ICT equipment and software, and the rest is on account of the impact 
of ICT investment on TFP growth (row 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
50 43%: calculated by expressing last column of row 3 as a percentage of last column of row 1  
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Table 4:  Impact of ICT capital on labour productivity 
  1973-95 1995-99 Change 1995-
2002 
Change 
1.       Labour productivity 1.41 2.36 0.96 2.61 1.2
Contributions from: 
2.       Capital deepening 0.72 0.98 0.26 1.2 0.49
3.       ICT capital 0.42 0.95 0.53 0.93 0.51
Of which           
4.       Computer hardware 0.22 0.52 0.31 0.47 0.25
5.       Software 0.12 0.33 0.2 0.33 0.21
6.       Communication 
 equipment 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.05
7.       Other capital 0.3 0.03 -0.26 0.27 -0.02
8.        Labour quality 0.27 0.3 0.03 0.25 -0.02
9.       TFP 0.42 0.98 0.56 1.15 0.74
Of which           
10.     ICT/semiconductor 0.3 0.72 0.41 0.7 0.4
11.     Other non-farm 
 business 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.45 0.34
Total ICT/semiconductor contribution to labour productivity 
12.     Sum of lines 3 and 10 0.72 1.66 0.94 1.63 0.91
13.     Share of line 1 in 
percent 51.6 70.4 98 62.6 75.5
Source: Oliner and Sichel (2003), as cited in Gordon (2004) 
However, some studies suggest that in order for countries to realise the benefits of 
ICT investment, it may have to be supplemented by appropriate regulatory 
frameworks and business models. The slowdown in productivity growth in the UK 
(and Europe in general) towards the end of the nineties, in sharp contrast to the US 
experience, is arguably on account of differences in the impact of ICT capital on 
productivity. This may have been on account of a paucity of complementary skills in 
the UK relative to the US,51 or on account of more restrictive regulations that govern 
the three ICT-using industries that were the main contributors to productivity growth 
in the US,52 namely, wholesale, retail and security trading industries.53 
                                            
 
51 Basu et al. 2003 
52 Gordon 2004 
53 For example, European retail outlets have not been able to replicate the “big box” formats of the US 
outlets, in part on account of land use (or planning) regulations and in part on account of their 
concentration within cities. 
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Table 5:  Impact of ICT capital on labour productivity 
  1973-95 1995-99 Change 1995-
2002 
Change 
1.       Labour productivity 1.41 2.36 0.96 2.61 1.2
Contributions from: 
2.       Capital deepening 0.72 0.98 0.26 1.2 0.49
3.       ICT capital 0.42 0.95 0.53 0.93 0.51
Of which       
4.       Computer hardware 0.22 0.52 0.31 0.47 0.25
5.       Software 0.12 0.33 0.2 0.33 0.21
6.       Communication 
 equipment 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.05
7.       Other capital 0.3 0.03 -0.26 0.27 -0.02
8.        Labour quality 0.27 0.3 0.03 0.25 -0.02
9.       TFP 0.42 0.98 0.56 1.15 0.74
Of which       
10.     ICT/semiconductor 0.3 0.72 0.41 0.7 0.4
11.     Other non-farm 
 business 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.45 0.34
Total ICT/semiconductor contribution to labour productivity 
12.     Sum of lines 3 and 10 0.72 1.66 0.94 1.63 0.91
13.     Share of line 1 in 
 percent 51.6 70.4 98 62.6 75.5
Source: Oliner and Sichel (2003), as cited in Gordon (2004) 
The evidence on the cyclicality of business investment suggests that investment in 
ICT capital might also be pro-cyclical. This is borne out by the US experience, 
namely, large increase in ICT investment during the second half of the nineties 
followed by a sharp drop in it after the adverse shocks in 2000-2001. 
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Figure 5:  ICT investment growth and GDP growth in the US 
 
Source: EUKLEMS Growth and productivity accounts 
Data from the UK suggest that investments in IT capital and CT capital are both pro-
cyclical. The correlation coefficient of GDP growth and growth of investment in IT 
capital, for the 1986-2005 period is 0.48. The corresponding correlation coefficient for 
the growth in CT investment is 0.44. But investment in the latter is more volatile than 
investment in the former. By contrast, investment in software does not exhibit 
cyclicality, with a correlation coefficient of 0.02. 
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4.2.4 Mixed evidence about investment in human capital 
There is consensus about the proposition that human capital and productivity are 
positively correlated. Human capital of employees influences a firm’s ability to absorb 
new technology.54 It can also contribute to inter-firm spillover effects that augment 
productivity,55 even though benefits from such spillover may disproportionately 
accrue to high technology firms. The relationship between human capital of 
employees and firm-level productivity is, of course, complex,56 and is affected by 
environmental factors such as workplace practices within firms.57 But the positive 
impact of employee human capital on productivity is not in question.58 
A firm’s employee human capital is dependent on both its ability to hire well trained 
and skilled individuals, and its policies regarding apprenticeships and training. 
Economic theory suggests that individuals’ investment in human capital as well as 
apprenticeships and training should be countercyclical because opportunity cost of 
labour time is lower during periods of economic downturn. However, this line of 
argument presumes perfect capital markets, i.e., the ability of firms and individuals to 
pay for education and training (or bear lower wages associated with apprenticeship) 
during periods of economic downturn by borrowing against expected (increased) 
earnings during recovery and the subsequent period of economic upturn. Hence, it 
may not be supported by the empirical evidence. 
Empirical evidence suggests that school enrolment and investment in higher 
education are indeed countercyclical in OECD countries that have well functioning 
credit markets.59 However, availability of credit can be a binding constraint for 
investment in human capital, as evidence from the pro-cyclicality of such investment 
in emerging markets. 
Evidence about the cyclicality of training of existing employees is mixed. A recent 
study suggests that employee training is pro-cyclical in Europe.60 In the United 
                                            
 
54 Griffith et al. 2004 
55 For example, it was found that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of college graduates in a 
city can increase the output of an average firm by as much as half a percentage point (Moretti 2004). 
56 Studies have demonstrated, for example, that ICT related human capital of managers contributes 
much less to productivity growth than comparable human capital of non-managerial employees. 
Similarly, addition to ICT knowledge of employees has a much larger impact on productivity growth in 
the services sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
57 Black and Lynch 1996, 2001 
58 Dearden et al. (2006) report that even after making appropriate methodological corrections for the 
possibility that firm strategies like provision of training is not random and that certain types of firms are 
more likely than others to adopt such strategies, they obtain statistically and economically significant 
estimates of training on productivity in the UK. They find that a 1 percent increase in the proportion of 
employees that receive training leads to a 0.6 percent increase in productivity. 
59 DeJong and Ingram 2001, Dellas and Koubi 2003, Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003, Sakellaris and 
Spilimbergo 2000 
60 Bassanini and Brunello 2008 
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States, on the other hand, training exhibits weak counter-cyclicality (as well as a high 
degree of volatility).61  
Finally, consistent with the European evidence about the pro-cyclicality of training, 
demand for apprentices is also pro-cyclical, at least in the United Kingdom.62 In 
particular, apprenticeships decline noticeably during periods of significant economic 
downturn, for example, during the Great Depression, in the early seventies and later 
between 1989 and 1992.63 During the last of these periods, the decline in the number 
of apprentices was 15 percent. 
                                            
 
61 Sepulveda 2004 
62 Brunello 2009 
63 Stevens 1994, Felstead and Green 1992, Hart 2005  
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5. Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. They are as 
follows: 
a) Productivity is pro-cyclical, essentially an outcome of labour hoarding, as 
employees reduce or increase their effort as the demand for output falls or 
increases, combined with economies of scale that arises during periods of 
economic boom 
 
b) While net entry accounts for a significant proportion of productivity growth, 
especially during periods of economic downturn, within-firm changes –
involving restructuring and investment in new capital, technology and human 
resources – generally account for a greater proportion of productivity growth 
 
c) The relatively smaller contribution of net entry could be on account of 
institutional weaknesses that prevent exit and entry of firms, as well as 
rigidities that prevent transfer of resources from incumbent firms to new 
entrants 
d) The contribution of net entry to productivity growth may also be limited by the 
numerical dominance of single-plant firms in the firm population; much of the 
benefits of creative destruction accrue from entry and exit of plants owned by 
multi-plant firms 
e) Within-firm changes that determine productivity growth are, broadly speaking, 
innovation, investment in ICT and non-ICT capital, and investment in human 
capital  
f) Although productivity is positively correlated with competitive pressures, it is 
especially the case in fragmented industries and firms that are close to the 
technology frontier. In other cases competition can have a negative impact  
g) It is difficult to predict the cyclicality of innovation, as greater access to credit 
supports innovation during periods of economic growth but during downturns 
firms tend to reallocate resources to prepare for subsequent recovery. 
However, private R & D expenditure tends to be pro-cyclical  
h) Aggregate business investment is pro-cyclical and also more volatile than 
output. There is no simple relationship between total business investment and 
GDP growth as the quality of business investment and other forms of 
investment, such as intangible investment, play a role   
i) Investment in ICT capital has made a significant contribution to productivity 
over the previous period of expansion and there is some evidence that it might 
be pro-cyclical  
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j) Although economic theory suggests that individual investment in human 
capital should be countercyclical, empirical evidence suggests pro-cyclicality 
of training, in particular apprenticeships. There is mixed evidence on the 
cyclicality of training of existing employees 
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Part 2 
Impact of the 2008-2009 Recession on Productivity and 
Recovery in the UK 
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1. Introduction 
As the UK economy emerges from the worst recession since the Great Depression 
of the thirties,64 the recovery process is challenging.65 An economic brief published 
by the European Commission (EC) estimates that the financial crisis that 
precipitated the recession could lead to a loss in potential output of the order of 5 
percent in the European Union (EU), with severe consequences for long term 
growth prospects.66 As Government’s ability to stimulate demand will be limited for 
the foreseeable future, growth in the long run will have to be driven largely by 
productivity gains.  
This paper addresses this policy issue, and examines evidence on the determinants 
of productivity growth in the UK, with emphasis on the impact of the 2008-09 
recession on these determinants.67 It then takes a view on the outlook for these 
determinants of productivity growth during the recovery period. However, the 
discussion does not take into consideration the impact of the Spending Review 
which was presented to the Parliament on 20 October 2010, and which has fixed 
spending budgets for government departments until 2014-15.  
It is generally accepted that recessions offer an opportunity to innovate, as output 
declines and thereby reduces the opportunity cost of productive resources. 
Companies that take the opportunity to innovate during economic downturns 
emerge stronger to take better advantage of the subsequent upturn, while many 
companies that do not innovate remain weak, and eventually exit the market. This 
indeed is the basis for the much-discussed Schumpeterian “creative destruction”.  
Government has played an important role in recovery from financial crises in other 
countries, eg in Sweden and Finland in the early nineties the loss of potential output 
was limited by productivity-augmenting restructuring and innovation policies. In 
1993, following three years of deep recession, the Finnish government helped 
coordinate leverage of the country’s strong engineering legacy, transforming it into a 
“knowledge economy”. Finland’s annual productivity growth rose by 30 percent over 
the decade.68 Not surprisingly, policies adopted by OECD governments to mitigate 
the effects of the 2008-09 recession included measures such as investment in 
                                            
 
64 According to latest estimates, the UK economy shrank by a cumulative 6.5 percent during the 
course of the recession. 
65 Recent projections of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that UK GDP will grow by the 1.7 
percent in 2010, matching the Euro area’s average growth rate, and by 2.0 percent in 2011,higher 
than the projected 1.5 percent growth in the Euro area. (Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, 
Washington, D.C. (October 2010))  
66 Koopman and Szekely, 2009 
67 The ECFIN economic brief above argues that as well as restructuring the financial sector, EU 
economies have to focus on increasing productivity growth, in particular through better use of research 
and innovation. 
68 Leadbeater, 2008 
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infrastructure, support for research and development (R&D), investment in human 
capital, and support for innovation including support for innovation and investment 
in small and medium enterprises (SMEs).69 
This paper argues that while considering policy options it is important to view 
individual factors that affect productivity, such as business investment and 
innovation, as interdependent components of a system, rather than as isolated 
drivers of productivity. The conceptual framework for this interrelated system is 
presented in the next section. Thereafter, given that data are available for individual 
determinants of productivity such as business investment and innovation, it 
examines the impact of the recession on these individual factors, but links between 
these individual factors are made where necessary. An attempt is made to 
distinguish between cyclical and structural factors affecting productivity growth in 
the UK, arguing that future policy initiatives should address structural far more than 
cyclical factors. 
 
                                            
 
69 Germany, for example, has invested €11.5 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) in infrastructure, €1.4 billion 
(0.1 percent of GDP) in science, R&D and innovation, €14.5 billion (0.6 percent of GDP) in education, 
and €5.7 billion (0.2 percent of GDP) in green technologies that embody the cutting edge of 
technological R&D and new ideas. The corresponding figures for the United States of America (USA) 
are $100 billion (0.7 percent of GDP), $16 billion (0.11 percent of GDP), $83 billion (0.58 percent of 
GDP) and $59 billion (0.41 percent of GDP), respectively. (Source: Policy responses to the economic 
crisis: Investing in innovation for long term growth, OECD (June 2009), Table 4) 
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2. Determinants of productivity 
 
 
 Investment, infrastructure, innovation, skills, enterprise and competition 
are key determinants of productivity and should be regarded as 
interdependent components of an integrated system 
 
 While pursuing productivity growth, it is difficult to substitute any of 
these determinants with one or more others, as they are complements 
 
 
The academic literature has identified a number of factors which have an impact on 
productivity. Growth of multifactor or total factor productivity (TFP) is driven by 
technological changes, at least part of which can be embodied in physical capital, as 
well as by environmental factors such as competition. Growth in labour productivity 
(more commonly used for policy purposes) is affected by factors such as changes in 
capital intensity and the skill level of the labour force as well as TFP growth.  
While factor inputs such as investment in technology have a direct impact on 
productivity and productivity growth, environmental factors such as competition have 
an indirect and complex impact. Competition gives companies the incentive to 
improve efficiency through product and process innovation, and invest in new 
technology and human capital,70 but the extent of competition and the generation of 
innovative ideas are in turn influenced by entry of new companies.  
Academic research sometimes uses reduced form empirical models71 to explore the 
impact of the individual aspects of competition on productivity and its growth.72 This 
simplifying approach in empirical research is often reflected in the approach of policy 
makers towards the management of productivity and its growth. In the UK, for 
example, discussion about determinants of productivity often revolves around inter-
related factors that are functionally separable:73  
                                            
 
70 However, too much competition might also reduce the incentive to innovate, given that competition 
will reduce the ability of the innovative companies to earn supernormal profits for an extended period 
of time. See Aghion, 2005 
71 Reduced form models abstract from the complex inter-relatedness of economic factors, and present 
summative views of relationships between economic variables. For example, it is well known that in a 
market price is jointly determined by aggregate demand and aggregate supply, but price itself has an 
impact on the buying and selling decisions of individual consumers and producers. A reduced form 
model abstracts from this complexity, and posits that quantity exchanged in a market depends on 
income and other demand-side factors such as tastes and preferences, as also on factors such as 
technology that affects supply decisions. 
72 Aghion, 2006, and Parisi, 2006 
73 DTI, 2006 
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 Investment in physical capital such as machinery and equipment. 
 Infrastructure that facilitates both physical and virtual interaction between the 
market players. Traditional examples of infrastructure therefore include road 
and railway networks, while more contemporary examples include fibre optics 
networks that facilitate interaction through cyberspace.74 
 Innovation which involves generation and exploitation of new ideas that can 
take the form of new technology, new designs, new processes, etc. 
 Skills which involve investment in the human capital of workers, and improve 
their ability to both generate and adapt to new ideas. 
 Enterprise which involves seizing opportunities to start new companies, often 
based on new ideas about products and processes. 
 Competition which provides the incentive to undertake investment in physical 
and human capital, and innovate, and supports the socially efficient allocation 
of resources, depending on market frameworks and institutions. 
The separation of the determinants of productivity along these lines, the intellectual 
basis of which can be traced back to empirical analysis of reduced form models in 
the academic literature, is appealing from a functional point of view. However, such 
separation is difficult to justify from a conceptual point of view. It is evident from the 
above discussion that factors such as market entry by new companies, competition, 
innovation and investment in physical and human capital are inter-related. Therefore, 
rather than thinking about them individually, one has to think about them as 
interdependent components of an integrated system. The system itself can be 
depicted as follows: 
                                            
 
74 Arguably, infrastructure could also include regulatory structures of countries. The importance of 
regulatory infrastructure has increased manifold in the aftermath of the financial crisis that precipitated 
the last recession. 
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Figure 6: Determinants of productivity 
 
 
The diagram captures the characteristics of the system discussed above. The extent 
of competition is determined by a range of factors, including product market entry 
and competition policy. Entry itself is affected by competition (which affects returns 
on investment), regulation, and ease of access to physical infrastructure. Competition 
is also influenced by the state of physical infrastructure, which can affect the extent of 
market segmentation, and it in turn affects companies’ incentives to invest in physical 
and human capital. Finally, firms’ innovation capability depends on access to new 
capital, new technology and skilled workers, and itself provides a competitive edge to 
innovation-active companies, which sharpens competition. 
An important implication of this systemic view of the determinants of productivity is 
that, while pursuing productivity growth, it is difficult to substitute any one of these 
drivers with one or more of the others, i.e., they are complements. For example, 
investment in new technology embodied in physical capital may not augment 
productivity unless it is supplemented by an increase in the skill level of the work 
force. Similarly, while competition may provide the incentive to innovate, certain 
types of innovation might be infeasible without adequate access to appropriate 
infrastructure such as high speed data networks. While policy emphasis can and 
should change with circumstances, effective policy making has to ensure that the 
balance among the different components of the system is maintained over time. 
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In the sections that follow, we discuss the individual components of this system. This 
approach is necessary since evidence is often collected for each functionally 
separable determinant of productivity and its growth.75 We revert to a more systemic 
approach towards the end of the paper, when we discuss the outlook for UK 
productivity. 
                                            
 
75 We do not discuss the aspect of competition that incentivises investment in physical and human 
capital, and innovation. Even in markets that experience a significant amount of new entry (and exit) 
by companies, competition evolves relatively slowly and short-term variations are difficult to measure. 
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3. Enterprise 
 
 Early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the UK compares favourably with 
those of many G7 countries but is lower than in the USA and emerging 
economies. An unfavourable entrepreneurial culture and associated 
social norms may be factors holding back UK entrepreneurship growth 
 
 Early-stage entrepreneurial activity has remained unaffected in the UK in 
the aftermath of the recent recession, even though access to finance 
proved difficult for nascent entrepreneurs 
 
 There was an increase in the number of insolvencies during this 
recession but it is not obvious whether this was chiefly driven by 
Schumpeterian dynamics or short term financial pressures 
 
 
Enterprise – the seizing of new business opportunities – is a key driver of productivity 
growth. New companies serve two different purposes. First, by increasing 
competition, they provide an incentive for incumbent companies to innovate, and 
thereby raise average productivity. Second, new companies introduce new ideas in 
the form of new products and new processes, which can transform the ways in which 
industries function, once again raising productivity. Indeed, even though a large 
proportion of new companies go out of business within three to four years of starting 
operation, enterprise is considered an important component of the “Schumpeterian 
dynamics” that drive productivity growth. Incumbent companies which are unable to 
match the innovation and productivity levels of surviving new entrants are driven out 
of business. This results in a reallocation of factor inputs from less productive to more 
productive units of production, raising average productivity. The benefits of 
competition and the role of enterprise in facilitating competition in the UK are well 
documented.76 
3.1 Policy discussion within the UK 
Overall, the enterprise level in the UK is comparable to the G7 average. Data 
collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project suggest that early-
stage entrepreneurial activity in the UK (measured as a percentage of the working 
age population) compares favourably with those in many other G7 countries. But it 
is significantly lower than early-stage entrepreneurial activities in the USA and fast 
growing emerging markets such as China and India (Figure 7). However, while 
early-stage entrepreneurial activity has declined in the USA in the aftermath of the 
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recent recession, it has remained unaffected – indeed increased marginally – in the 
UK. Further, nearly 80 percent of entrepreneurial activity in the UK is driven by 
opportunities, in contrast to emerging markets like China where about half of all 
such activities are driven by necessity.77 
Figure 7: Early-stage entrepreneurial activity (as % of working age population) 
 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: United Kingdom 2009 Monitoring Report, Figure 5 
However, enterprise is also hindered by structural (in the UK’s case, cultural) factors. 
Responding to the GEM survey, 25 experts assigned scores to factors that are 
known to influence entrepreneurship, on a 5-point scale, for the UK and some other 
G7 countries. Figure 8 compares the scores assigned to the UK and the USA. While 
the UK compares favourably with the USA in general, the scores suggest that 
unfavourable entrepreneurial culture and associated social norms are perhaps the 
single most important factor holding back growth of entrepreneurship in the UK. 
                                            
 
77 ‘Opportunity entrepreneurship’ refers to circumstances where economic agents become 
entrepreneurs by choice, to benefit from an unexploited opportunity in the market. By contrast, 
“necessity entrepreneurs” are essentially self-employed people who were forced into entrepreneurial 
activities because of absence of appropriate job opportunities. 
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Figure 8: Experts’ view on entrepreneurial conditions in UK and USA 
 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: United Kingdom 2009 Monitoring Report  
In a 2008 policy document78 (relating to 2006 data), the Government outlined its 
vision about ways to unlock entrepreneurial potential in the UK. It noted UK’s 
successes with respect to entrepreneurship, e.g., a 10 percent increase in the 
number of SMEs since 1997, improved survival rates with 71 percent of VAT 
registered companies continuing to be registered after three years, and faster growth 
of productivity among SMEs than among larger enterprises.  
However, it also recognised the challenges associated with growth of entrepreneurial 
activity in the UK. Some of the key challenges identified in the document are as 
follows: 
 Cultural inhibitions: Over a third of the working age population in the UK cite 
fear of failure as an explanation for not starting a business, the corresponding 
figure for the USA being 21 percent. Entrepreneurial activity is particularly low 
among women, with women-led businesses accounting for only 14 percent of 
the total. 
 Low growth ambitions: More than a third of UK businesses do not have 
ambitions to grow, and growth is weak even among those who intend to grow. 
Only about 20 percent of all businesses in the UK experience employment 
growth in a given year, and fewer than 10 percent experience sustained 
growth. 
                                            
 
78 HMT and BERR, 2008 
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 Low level of innovation: In 2006, fewer than half of the businesses improved 
on an existing product or service, and only 12 percent introduced a new 
product or service. This low level of innovation was consistent with low level of 
training for managers; only about a quarter of managers receive any training. 
In a 2009 document,79 the CBI made several specific policy recommendations to help 
increase entrepreneurial activity in the UK. The main thrust of the policy 
recommendations was to reduce tax burden of SMEs and improve their access to 
debt and equity capital. Some of the key recommendations are as follows: 
 reducing the corporation tax rate to 18 percent 
 doubling of investment allowance to £100,000, and introduction of a system of 
payable tax credits to SMEs that are not sufficiently profitable to benefit from 
investment allowance 
 implementating a modification of the capital gains tax to offset damage to 
SMEs and entrepreneurs 
 making the cost of raising equity tax deductible, to encourage equity 
investment in SMEs 
 widening the scope of publicly funded financing schemes to provide access to 
medium sized companies 
 fostering partnerships between major banks and the government to provide 
SMEs with a mix of long term debt and equity 
 helping to improve energy efficiency of SMEs, for example, by providing low-
interest loans through the Carbon Trust 
3.2 Entrepreneurial activity during recession and recovery 
The recent recession made entrepreneurial activity difficult. Nearly two-thirds of 
nascent entrepreneurs and new business owners surveyed by GEM in 2009 felt that 
it was more difficult to start a business - 44 percent had lower expectations for 
growth, while 51 percent felt there were fewer business opportunities. 
Not surprisingly given the nature of the recession, access to finance has been a 
problem for nascent entrepreneurs in the UK. The GEM survey revealed a steep 
increase in the proportion of entrepreneurs who sought and were refused finance by 
banks and other sources (Table 6). However, despite the increase, the overall 
proportion of nascent entrepreneurs who sought and were refused finance may not 
have been very high. 
                                            
 
79 CBI, 2009  
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Table 6: Percentage of UK nascent entrepreneurs who sought and were 
refused finance, by type of funding refused 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Friends and family 
4.7 3 4.8 10.9 
Individual investors (other than 
friends and family) 5.7 2.6 4.5 9.9 
Unsecured bank loans 
6.8 4.4 6.1 9.6 
Bank overdraft 
7.8 5.1 5.6 9.5 
Non-bank unsecured loan 
2.7 1.9 2.7 4.2 
Mortgage or other secured loan 
4.2 5.5 4.7 4 
Equity finance or formal venture 
capital 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.4 
Government grants 
6.1 8.1 6.1 7.8 
Credit cards 
4.4 4.6 4.7 4.8 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: United Kingdom 2009 Monitoring Report, Table 9 
The difficulty experienced by nascent entrepreneurs in accessing finance is also 
reflected in the data on fixed term lending and overdrafts (Figure 9). While the month-
on-month change in fixed term lending and overdrafts accessed by SMEs was 
positive until about the middle of 2009, the recovery period has witnessed sharply 
negative figures for both. However, since use of credit is influenced by both demand 
for and supply of credit, the extent of the decline in the use of fixed term lending and 
overdrafts that is influenced by supply constraints alone is not obvious. 
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Figure 9: Credit availability of SMEs (change over previous month) 
 
Source: British Bankers’ Association 
The difficulty in accessing financial resources notwithstanding, product market entry 
was unaffected in 2009, during the height of the recession. Data on new business 
banking relationships, an approximate yet highly suggestive measure of product 
market entry, shows that monthly average new business banking relationships was 
higher in 2009 than in 2008 (Figure 10). The monthly figures for new banking 
relationships declined steadily between September and December of 2009, before 
recovering during the January-March period of 2010. However, this pattern is similar 
to the one observed during the October 2008 to March 2009 period, and hence 
should be attributed to seasonal factors rather than to the recession or to cyclical 
factors in general. 
 45 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
 
Figure 10: New business banking relationships 
 
Source: British Bankers’ Association 
As we have already noted, creative destruction requires insolvencies and exits as 
much as the entry of new firms. The data suggest that there was also an increase in 
the number of company insolvencies in England and Wales during the recession. 
However, when we take into consideration the insolvency rate that is adjusted for the 
impact of the Enterprise Act of 2002, we find that while the insolvency rate was 
higher during 2008 and 2009 relative to 2007, it was lower compared to the 
comparable figures from earlier in the decade (Figure 11). However, we should be 
careful about drawing inferences about the implications of the modest rise in 
insolvency rates for productivity growth. Given the nature of the last recession, it is 
not obvious as to whether firm exits during the recession was largely driven by 
Schumpeterian dynamics or whether a significant proportion of firms exited merely on 
account of short term financial pressures driven by inability to raise working capital or 
roll over existing debt. 
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Figure 11: Insolvencies 
 
Source: Experian 
3.3 Outlook for enterprise 
Enterprise in the medium run may be affected adversely by weak growth and 
the difficulty in accessing reasonably-priced financial resources that generally 
follows a financial crisis. But these difficulties might in part be offset by fiscal 
incentives. The June 2010 emergency budget provides some fiscal incentives 
for small businesses. They are as follows:80 
 A one-year increase in the level of small business rate relief, from 1 October 
2010, “giving full relief for eligible businesses with a rateable value of up to 
£6,000 and tapering relief to £12,000”. 
 A proposal to abolish the requirement that, for eligibility for R&D tax credits, 
the intellectual property (IP) of the R&D has to be owned by the company 
making the claim. 
In addition, the government seeks to address the financing problem of SMEs by 
establishing a Growth Capital Fund that would provide £2-10 million in the form 
of growth capital to fast growing SMEs that are not being served by the market. 
                                            
 
80 HMT, 2010 
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The longer term challenge, however, is twofold.  
 First, there has to be a significant change in the entrepreneurial culture and 
associated social norms. To recapitulate, a GEM survey of experts suggests 
that the observed UK-USA difference in enterprise levels can largely be 
attributed to culture and social norms.  
 Second, market entry can stimulate productivity only if both entering and 
incumbent companies strive to realise their growth ambitions. Haskel and 
Heden show that new entry accounts for around half of all improvements in 
productivity, but comparisons with other countries in particular the US suggest 
potential for increasing the contribution of enterprise to productivity growth by 
entrants and incumbents. This will require that individual employees (both 
managerial and non-managerial) be more enterprising.  
However in the UK many companies do not fit this profile, either because 
organisational culture inhibits enterprise on the part of employees, or because 
risk associated with enterprise is overestimated. This is consistent with the 
observation that many businesses in the UK may not be innovative. However 
the route towards more entrepreneurial behavioural may not lie in fiscal 
incentives or greater access to finance alone. A better understanding of 
behaviour would be required to facilitate formulation of appropriate policies. 
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4. Infrastructure 
 
 The weakness of UK infrastructure compared with other industrialised 
economies can be traced back to low levels of investment over long time 
periods. This is a concern regularly expressed by business 
 
 The future of the UK infrastructure is likely to depend mainly on the 
ability to sustain investment in the present fiscal and financial 
environment and also on the ability to successfully implement 
productivity-augmenting demand management e.g. flexible working to 
mitigate transport congestion. The latter in turn will depend on digital 
infrastructure quality 
 
 
It is well understood that infrastructure enhances efficiency and welfare by facilitating 
transactions and hence improving allocation of resources.81 Further, a reduction in 
transportation costs can facilitate formation of production clusters that has 
implications for the economies of agglomeration.82 Both these factors have 
implications for productivity growth, and hence for GDP and welfare.83 Evidence 
suggests that investment in road building projects added 1.4 percentage points to 
TFP growth in the USA between 1951 and 1973, but that diminishing returns set in 
thereafter.84 
It has been demonstrated that investment in individual types of infrastructure results 
in rapidly diminishing returns, and that there are complementarities between 
infrastructure and physical and human capital. In other words, a case can be made 
for investment not in any one type of infrastructure, but rather in a wider portfolio of 
infrastructure projects.85 Further, in the absence of appropriate infrastructure, 
investment in physical and human capital might not by themselves generate 
significant productivity growth. Unsurprisingly, the 2009 OECD review of the UK 
                                            
 
81 Some elements of infrastructure such as energy are direct inputs into the production process. While 
provision of such infrastructure has serious implications for growth, therefore, by virtue of the fact that 
they are inputs in the production process, they do not directly contribute to TFP growth. 
82 Craft, 2009 
83 Craft (2009) argues that the welfare and GDP benefits of the Crossrail project, which takes into 
account intangibles such as welfare implications of time savings and the impact of the investment on 
safety and environment, could be as high as £19,991 million and £20,069 million, respectively. More 
generally, evidence points at strong positive influence of investment in many different types of 
infrastructure on GDP per capita, in the UK (see Egert et al. 2009)  
84 Fernald, 1999 
85 OECD, 2006 
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economy recommends improvements in public infrastructure, especially transport, to 
boost productivity.86 
A key issue in planning the delivery of infrastructure is that the use of all 
infrastructure facilities varies over time, the most obvious example being peak and 
off-peak times for road and rail transport. If capacity is created to ensure unhindered 
flow of traffic during peak hours, much of the capacity would be underutilised during 
off-peak hours, which is inefficient and expensive. Hence, efficient provision of 
infrastructure might require demand management, for example, managing traffic 
flows using instruments such as traffic lights (or variable speeds) and road pricing. 
4.1 Policy discussions within the UK 
The UK lags behind comparable industrialised economies with respect to the quality 
of its physical infrastructure. The 2010 Global Competitiveness Report released by 
the World Economic Forum suggests that the overall quality of infrastructure in the 
UK lags behind those of France, Germany, Japan and the USA (Figure 12). An 
examination of the individual components of this overall quality index suggests that 
the UK lags behind France and Germany in all the relevant sub-categories, while 
performing better than Japan and the USA in some of the sub-categories. The 
differences between the UK and the other four countries are particularly stark for 
road and rail infrastructure. 87 
                                            
 
86 OECD, 2009  
87 The ‘National Infrastructure Plan 2010’ highlights UK’s advantage vis-a-vis fast growing emerging 
markets might also be shrinking rapidly. For example, Brazil plans to spend US$560 billion on 
infrastructure during 2011-14, while China spent US$103 billion on railways in 2009 alone. 
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Figure 12: Infrastructure quality in the UK relative to large G7 economies 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2010, World Economic Forum 
The genesis of this weakness vis-a-vis other major industrialised countries can 
perhaps be traced back to relatively low levels of investment in physical 
infrastructure. Data for the 1997-2008 period suggest that the UK lagged almost all 
EU-15 countries in public investment, as a percentage of GDP (Figure 13). The 
problem of underinvestment, however, stretches back far longer. For example, 
“vehicle kilometres doubled between 1979 and 2007, while the total length of road 
network increased by 17 percent” (Craft, 2009: pp. 328).  
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Figure 13: Annual average of public investment/GDP in EU-15 countries (1997-
2008) 
 
Source: Crafts (2009), Table 2 
In 2000, it was estimated that the cost of delay on account of road congestion in the 
UK equals 3.6 percent of GDP. A 2010 poll conducted by the British Chambers of 
Commerce suggests that about 80 percent of businesses are affected by the 
weaknesses in UK’s transport network; 64 percent are affected through loss of man 
hours while 49 percent are affected through increased operating costs.88 While the 
costs per year are relatively low (below £5,000) for a majority of the surveyed 
businesses that could provide estimates, nearly a third of them incurred costs of over 
£10,000, with 9 percent of them incurring cost of more than £50,000 (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Cost to business of transport infrastructure problems 
 
Source: British Chambers of Commerce (2010) 
A more limited survey of London businesses, undertaken by the Confederation of 
British Industries in 2010,89 finds that 85 percent of the respondents are concerned 
about the adverse impact of the lack of quality and reliability of the city’s transport 
network on their productivity. The corresponding figure in the June 2009 survey was 
76 percent. 
The Eddington Study of 200690 recognises both the importance of transport 
infrastructure in promoting productivity and GDP growth, and the impact of some of 
its components such as road transport to contribute to environmental damage. 
However, returns on public investment in infrastructure are so high that substantial 
benefits remain even after accounting for the impact of infrastructure use on the 
environment. For example, the Study finds that every £1 spent on transportation in 
urban areas, inter-urban routes and surface access to international gateways 
generates average returns of £3, just under £2 and £6, respectively.91 It promotes 
                                            
 
89 CBI, 2010  
90 HMT and DfT, 2006  
91 The return to inter-urban routes increases to just under £5 once expensive rail infrastructure 
projects are removed from the sample. 
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appropriate pricing as a key mechanism to strike a balance between efficient use of 
infrastructure and its environmental impact.92 
The Study also promoted the introduction of an independent Planning Commission to 
take decisions on strategically important projects. The Infrastructure Planning 
Commission was created under the Planning Act of 2008. The 2009 OECD review of 
the UK economy suggests that the Commission “will put in place a faster, more 
certain and transparent process for planning for major national infrastructure 
projects” (pp. 127). Unsurprisingly, the 2010 British Chambers of Commerce survey 
suggests that 62 percent of businesses support the idea of an independent planning 
commission for infrastructure development.93 
The 2009 OECD review suggests that some progress has been made in addressing 
infrastructure issues that have a bearing on productivity growth (Table 7). However, 
the survey data reported above make a persuasive case for further action. 
Table 7: OECD progress report on infrastructure development 
Desired action Progress since 2007 
Ensure that infrastructure 
investment does not fall short 
of that envisaged in the 
government’s Ten Year Plan of 
Transport. Consider ways to 
improve the predictability of 
transport funding. Follow 
through with targeted spending 
in key areas. 
The government will implement five 
year transport plans to provide greater 
certainty. This follows the example of 
the “control periods” for rail. Targeted 
spending in key areas was announced 
in January 2009, for example detailing 
a National Roads Programme of up to 
£6 billion to increase capacity and 
reduce congestion in the worst affected 
areas. 
Continue to examine the 
options for addressing road 
congestion and environmental 
impacts including the 
implementation of a road-
pricing system on a national 
scale. 
A demonstration project to trial the 
technology and processes that could 
underpin more sophisticated road 
charging systems will be underway by 
spring 2009. In addition, the 
government is bringing forward 
schemes where capacity can be 
increased at peak times through the 
opening of the hard shoulder. 
Source: OECD (2009) 
                                            
 
92 The April 2010 survey by the British Chambers of Commerce suggests that at this point only 12 
percent of surveyed businesses would accept a full road pricing scheme. However, nearly 40 percent 
are willing to accept motorway tolling, while both lane tolling and ring-fencing fuel duty are supported 
by 25 percent of the surveyed businesses. 
93 Along the same lines, the Confederation of British Industries has proposed setting up an 
independent Highways Agency to help deliver better outcomes (CBI, March 2010) 
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4.2 Infrastructure development during recession and recovery 
The fiscal stimulus in the UK during the 2008-09 recession did not include large scale 
additional expenditures that were specifically targeted towards improving 
infrastructural quality.94 However, the fiscal measures aimed at combating the 
recession and the rise of unemployment did include measures that had implications 
for infrastructural quality. For example, the credit provided by the Treasury 
Infrastructure Finance Unit, which was set up in March 2009, to private finance 
initiative (PFI) projects that were finding it difficult to raise debt finance during the 
crisis. The credit helped safeguard £13 billion of PFI projects. Similarly, the £700 
million of transport spending was brought forward from 2010-11 into 2009-10. Of this, 
£400 million was to be used by the Highway Agency to improve the quality of 
important motorways such as M1 and M6, and develop strategically important road 
networks. 
Both during the recession and during the subsequent recovery period, private 
investment in infrastructure, especially by the utilities companies, continued 
unabated. For example, during 2008-10, water companies planned investments of 
£8.5 billion. Similarly, regulated gas and electricity networks expected to invest over 
£4 billion a year during both 2009-10 and 2010-11. The investment of Network Rail 
during these two years is expected to be similar, in excess of £4.5 billion per year, 
and total expenditure of the railway company over the 5-year period commencing 
April 2009 is expected to be £34.6 billion. 
The 2009 Budget highlighted the commitments of the government in improving the 
quality of Britain’s infrastructure.95 The budget recognises the need for investment in 
infrastructure, e.g., the need for £100 billion investment in the energy sector over the 
following ten years to enable the government to meet its renewable energy target. 
This recognition is backed by budgetary support; a total of £405 million will be 
allocated to support the development of the low carbon energy sector and advanced 
green manufacturing sector, including an allocation of £250 million from the new 
Strategic Investment Fund. 
However, whereas the government recognises the need for improvement in certain 
types of infrastructure – it is committed to providing universal access to broadband 
with a speed of 2 Mbps by 2012 – it is reliant on the private sector companies to help 
meet these targets. The aim is to create a regulatory environment and a business 
environment in which private enterprises would make significant investments in 
Britain’s infrastructure.  
 
                                            
 
94  By contrast, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed by the US Congress in February 
2009 made available US$ 275 billion for federal contracts, grants and loans, and part of this money 
was meant to be used for construction and repair of roads, expansion of broadband and wireless 
services, investment in the domestic renewable energy industry, etc. 
95 HMT (2009) ‘Budget 2009: Building Britain’s Future’ 
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4.3 Looking ahead 
The future of infrastructure in the UK is likely to depend on two factors, the first of 
which is the ability to sustain investment in transport and other infrastructure in the 
present fiscal and financial environment. The 2009 OECD review of the UK economy 
recognises that “the financial crisis poses a problem with the ongoing viability of 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) funding of infrastructure projects” (pp. 127). While the 
private sector recommends continued public investment in infrastructure,96 and even 
though the Spending Review has “increased the capital envelope [for investment in 
infrastructure] by £2.3 billion a year by 2014-15 relative to the Budget plan,”97 the 
challenge lies in accommodating UK’s infrastructural needs in the shrinking 
government budget.  
The National Infrastructure Report 2010 suggests that in the future the government 
might have to be selective about investment in infrastructure, leaving infrastructure 
investment to the private sector wherever possible. Specifically, it should intervene if 
high social or environmental costs, or risks such as unproven technology, deter 
private investment. It should also intervene if the relevant infrastructure project has 
wider national interest, i.e., with significant positive externalities, or is of strategic 
importance. This view is reflected in the government’s intervention in initiatives such 
as Feed-in Tariffs. 
The 2010 BCC survey, which argues that a £30 billion investment in infrastructure 
will generate benefits of £86 billion, suggests that there is strong private sector 
support for the creation of a National Infrastructure Bank. Specifically, 65 percent of 
the businesses surveyed would support the creation of such a bank that would pool 
together public and private sector resources. The extent of the support rises to 69 
percent in East of England and to 73 percent in Northern Ireland. This demand is, in 
part, being met by the initiative to set up a Green Investment Bank for investment in 
green infrastructure, with £1 billion in capitalisation from the government. 
By contrast, the 2010 report from CBI is more optimistic about the scope for the 
continued use of public-private partnerships (PPP) for financing infrastructure 
projects. CBI is also optimistic about the use of tax incremental funding (TIF) 
schemes to deliver infrastructure. Further, it recommends that community 
infrastructure levies (CIL) be amended “to include a direct obligation on local 
authorities to deliver transport projects” (pp. 23).  
The second factor that has significant implications for productivity-enhancing 
infrastructural development in the UK relates to the digital sector. The 2010 CBI 
report suggests that flexible working practices might hold the key to mitigating road 
congestion, thereby reducing the pressure on transport infrastructure. While offering 
better work-life balance that facilitates staff retention, flexible working is therefore an 
important component of productivity growth. The ability to successfully implement 
                                            
 
96 The CBI recommends government net capital spend to be of the order of 2.25 percent of GDP 
97 HMT, October 2010  
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productivity-augmenting flexible working, in turn, would depend on the quality of 
digital infrastructure. 
The 2010 BCC survey indicates that while fewer businesses experience problems 
with digital communications (63 percent) than with transport (80 percent), the quality 
of the former nevertheless adds to loss of man hours (45 percent) and increased 
operating cost (32 percent) of a significant proportion of the surveyed businesses 
(Figure 15). Note also that this does not take into consideration the role that digital 
communication can play in facilitating exchange and joint development of ideas, 
products and processes across geographical boundaries. The difficulties experienced 
by those involved in generation and development of such ideas, products and 
processes might be greater still. A 2006 report by the OECD, on the future of 
infrastructure, found that the UK was ahead of its fellow EU countries in its attempt to 
unbundle the potential of some aspects of its digital communications infrastructure. 
But the findings of the recent surveys reported above are sobering. 
Figure 15: Problems experienced as a result of poor infrastructure: Transport 
vs. digital communications 
 
Source: BCC (April 2010) 
The National Infrastructure Plan 2010 indicates that the government seeks to 
encourage greater private sector investment in superfast broadband networks. It 
plans to do so by releasing electromagnetic spectrum from public use, making 
targeted interventions wherever required, and appropriate regulatory changes. 
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In an era of fiscal tightening financing infrastructure development would be 
challenging. In the absence of appropriate investment, however, accelerating 
productivity growth in the long run might be even more so. The challenge therefore 
lies in operationalising the targets that the government has set for itself in the 
National Infrastructure Report 2010. 
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5. Competition 
 
 There are indications that the gap between the UK goods market 
efficiency with the USA and Germany has declined since the onset of the 
recession. The prognosis for the UK labour market efficiency is quite 
favourable 
 
 However, competition may discourage innovation among firms that are 
far away from the technology frontier and this may be the reason why 
innovation levels are low among a sizeable proportion of firms in the UK 
 
 
The positive impact of competition on firm efficiency and productivity is well 
understood. Competition affects aggregate productivity in four different ways.  
 It ensures that less productive firms exit the market, thereby increasing the 
average productivity of an industry (and hence an economy) by construction.  
 The exit of less productive firms increases allocative efficiency, i.e., productive 
resources such as capital and labour are used by more productive firms rather 
than by less productive firms.  
However, the impact of these factors on productivity growth is relatively small and 
varies over the business cycle.98 In particular, during periods of recovery, the impact 
of within-firm factors that are influenced by competition is greater.  
 The threat of exit induces firms to innovate and increase their productivity to 
ensure their own survival, thereby raising aggregate productivity.  
 Finally, competition is ensured by contestability of product markets, i.e., by the 
ability of new firms to enter without incurring high entry costs. Many of these 
new firms have innovative ideas that are adopted by some of the incumbents 
over time, thereby accelerating productivity growth. This last issue has 
relevance for a debate on enterprise.  
                                            
 
98 Evidence suggests that net entry is a bigger determinant of aggregate productivity growth during 
periods of economic slowdown. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that periods of 
economic slowdown have a “cleansing effect” on aggregate productivity by way of firm exit. Second, it 
suggests that during periods of rapid economic growth the within-firm factors play a much bigger role 
in boosting productivity (and productivity growth) than net entry. See Bartelsman and Doms, 2000, and 
Scarpetta et al., 2002.  
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The overall impact of competition on productivity is positive and significant.99 
However, recent research suggests that competition increases innovation – the main 
driver of within-firm productivity growth – only among firms that are already close to 
the technology frontier. Firms that are far away from this frontier might actually be 
discouraged to innovate when they experience competitive pressures.100 To the 
extent that the compulsion to innovate is the main driver of growth in a competitive 
environment, therefore, the magnitude of the impact of competition on productivity 
growth depends on the distribution of the productivity levels of the firms relative to the 
technology frontier. 
5.1 Policy discussions within the UK 
A review of UK’s competition regime, undertaken by KPMG in 2007,101 suggests that 
the UK’s regime compares favourably with those of the USA, Germany and the EU. 
The UK’s regime has consistently performed better than that of the EU since 2001, 
and has narrowed the gap with the USA and Germany over the same period (Figure 
16). The review also suggests that the UK has narrowed the gap between its merger 
regime and those of the US and Germany. In part, this is on account of the continued 
use of robust economic analysis102 and in part on account of a decline in complex 
mergers in the USA during the two years preceding the survey that formed the basis 
for the indices. 
                                            
 
99 OFT, 2007 
100 Aghion et al., 2005 
101 DTI & KPMG, 2007.  
102 One of the factors that contributed to the superiority of the US competition policy regime was the 
ability of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to undertake robust econometric analysis using a large 
number of data points. This was aided by the fact that a number of analysts at the FTC had academic 
background, and were therefore able to analytically push the boundaries of relevant economic theory. 
Apparently, the UK regulators have shrunk the gap vis-a-vis their US counterparts. 
60 
Productivity and the Economic Cycle 
Figure 16: Competition regime performance index 
 
Source: Peer review of competition policy, Department of Trade and Industry (2007) 
KPMG’s favourable conclusion about the effectiveness of the competition regime in 
the UK is also reflected in the index for product market efficiency reported by the 
World Economic Forum in some issues of its Global Competitiveness Report (Figure 
17). Goods market efficiency in the UK lags behind those of the US and Germany, 
but is greater than that in France. However, the gap relative to former two countries 
has declined since the onset of the recession in 2008. 
Figure 17: Goods market efficiency 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), World Economic Forum 
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In addition, labour market efficiency in the UK lags that in the USA but is much 
greater than those in Germany and France (Figure 18). Since market entry and exit, 
as also restructuring of firms to better survive competition, are critically dependent on 
labour market efficiency, the prognosis for the competition regime in the UK is quite 
favourable. 
Figure 18: Labour market efficiency 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), World Economic Forum 
As such, the competition regime in the UK facilitates robust competition among firms. 
However, as we have noted, competition may have a curvilinear impact on 
innovation, and hence productivity growth at the firm level. In particular, competitive 
pressures may discourage innovation among firms that are far away from the 
technology frontier, such that competition per se may not be a panacea for innovation 
and productivity growth.  
This indeed may be a reason as to why innovation levels are low among a sizeable 
proportion of firms in the UK, an issue that we shall discuss in further detail later in 
this paper. If this is indeed the case, however, such that low innovation level among a 
wide range of firms is the outcome of a rational decision making process in a 
competitive environment, rather than the outcome of a cultural factor, there is scope 
to address this issue using appropriate policy initiatives. 
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5.2 Competition during recession and recovery 
Economic theory does not make any predictions about the cyclicality of product 
market competition. During recessions, the exit rate of firms generally increases, 
while the entry rate falls. At the same time, there is generally a reduction in the size 
of the market itself, and hence the net effect is difficult to predict. The 2008-09 
recession in the UK, however, coincided with an event that had additional 
implications for competition. 
There was a significant increase in the market concentration in UK’s banking sector, 
in the aftermath of the merger between Lloyd’s TSB plc and HBOS plc. Using 2007 
market share data, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) estimated that the combined 
market share of PCAs of the two merged banks was 33 percent, double that of their 
closest competitors – the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, HSBC and Barclays – each 
of whose market share was between 14 and 17 percent.103 As a consequence, the 
4-firm concentration ratio (C4) increased from an already high 67 percent to a very 
high 80 percent. Correspondingly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) increased to 
1950, a change of nearly 500.104 
A reduction in banking sector competition can have two different effects on the 
lending behaviour of banks. First, the interest rate spread is likely to increase for 
most bank loan products, and banks are less likely to pass through changes in 
market interest rates.105 Second, banking sector competition has implications on the 
banks’ risk-taking behaviour. The stylised “risk shifting” paradigm suggests that the 
increase in loan rates arising from a reduction in competition can raise the credit risk 
of borrowers.106 However, recent evidence suggests that, in certain contexts, the 
market power of banks and the extent of risk taking might be negatively 
correlated.107 In other words, the increased concentration in UK’s banking sector 
had the potential to reduce risk taking by banks, increase interest rate spreads on 
loans, and make banks reluctant to pass through changes in market interest rates to 
borrowers. 
While there is no available analysis of the impact of the Lloyd’s-HBOS merger in 
January 2009, from early that year there was indeed an increase in the spread 
between loan rates offered by banks and the banks’ cost of borrowing from the 
central bank and the money markets (Figure 19). Available data, discussed earlier in 
the paper, suggest that since 2009 access to credit has also been adversely affected, 
especially for SMEs (Figure 9). However, there is no available estimate of the impact 
of the increase in the concentration ratio of the banking sector itself on disbursal of 
credit. 
                                            
 
103 OFT, October 2008  
104 In general, a market is deemed concentrated if HHI exceeds 1000, and a change of 100 or more in 
the HHI raises concerns about the impact of a merger on competition. 
105 Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008 
106 Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 
107 Jiménez et al., 2007 
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Figure 19: Bank rate, money market rates and mortgage rate 
 
Data source: Bank of England 
The higher interest rate spreads and the difficulty in access to bank loans have 
implications for both entry and exit rates, which, together with events such as 
mergers and acquisitions, jointly influence the extent of competition. In the absence 
of affordable bank finance, entry rates should decline and exit rates may rise on 
account of liquidity problems. However, available data suggests that entry rate (as 
measured by new business banking relationships) rose year-on-year during both 
2009 and 2010 (Figure 10), and since Q1 of 2009 the exit rate (as measured by 
insolvencies) has actually declined (Figure 11). In other words, the significant 
change in the structure of UK’s banking sector notwithstanding, the extent of 
competition in the other sectors may not have been affected adversely by changes 
in entry and exit rates during the recession and the subsequent recovery. 
At the same time, there was a steady decline in the number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) since 2007-08 (Figure 20). The decline in the number of M&A 
involving UK firms was especially sharp. This decline has been arrested since Q2 of 
2009, but the recovery period has not witnessed a significant increase in M&A. 
Hence, it is unlikely that competition during the recession and the recovery period 
was adversely affected by M&A in the non-financial sectors. 
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Figure 20: Mergers and acquisitions in the UK 
 
Data source: Office of National Statistics 
Overall, therefore, the 2008-09 recession and the subsequent recovery may not have 
resulted in a reduction in competition in the non-banking sectors. Concrete evidence 
about the extent of competition in UK’s non-banking sectors during this period is as 
yet unavailable. 
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6. Skills 
 
 There has been a sharp increase in the demand for university places 
during the recession and this trend is continuing during the subsequent 
recovery 
 
 There are indications that the recession may have had only a mild 
impact on training and apprenticeships 
 
 Even though the recession did not have a significant impact on skill 
formation, it is not obvious whether this will enable the UK to emerge as 
a technology leader given the existing weaknesses in the skill base 
compared to other industrialised countries 
 
 
The importance of skills for successful innovation, and for productivity growth in 
general, is well understood. In the UK, there was a significant increase in job skills 
between 1986 and 2006.108 For example, the proportion of jobs requiring Level 4 
education or higher increased from 20 percent in 1986 to 30 percent in 2006. 
Similarly, the proportion of employees using computerised or automated equipment 
in their job nearly doubled from 40.3 percent in 1986 to 77.4 percent in 2006. This is 
consistent with the OECD’s estimates that human capital accounted for an 
overwhelmingly large proportion of annual TFP growth in the UK between 1990 and 
2000.109 
6.1 Policy discussion within the UK 
Emphasising the relationship between skills and productivity, the Leitch Review of 
2006 argued that the UK has historically had a skill deficit vis-à-vis the other OECD 
countries. As a consequence, even though there was a noticeable increase in the 
skill level in the UK between the mid nineties and the middle of the last decade – for 
example, a 4 percentage point increase in the proportion of people with Level 4 and 
above education between 1994 and 2005, and a 236 percent increase in the number 
of apprentices between 1997 and 2005 – the country’s skill base is yet to catch up 
with those in leading OECD countries. 
                                            
 
108 Felstead, A., 2007 
109 OECD, 2003 
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The Leitch Review recommended that, in order to enhance skill levels in the UK,110 
the skill development system become demand-led, with a focus on skills that 
generate economic value. The greater employer involvement that is integral to a 
demand-led system could involve providing more apprenticeships, greater interaction 
between employers and universities, and an increase in the number of co-funded 
workplace degrees. It was felt that SMEs should be given greater access to the Train 
to Gain programme, which was discontinued from November 2010,111 and that these 
enterprises should gain access to grants that facilitate management and leadership 
training. It also recommended putting in place a culture that promotes continual 
upgrading of skills. 
The recommendations of the Leitch Review were consistent with the evidence 
reported in Felstead et al. (2007). Two important findings of the research are as 
follows:  
 Between 1986 and 2006 there was an increase in the mismatch between the 
qualifications of workers and the skills required for their jobs. Specifically, by 
2006, a large number of workers in jobs that did not require qualifications had 
one. But since qualifications and jobs-specific skills do not necessarily overlap, 
this did not mean that many of these workers did not require additional skills. 
This has implications for the “demand-led” approach advocated by the Leitch 
Review.  
 While most employees who underwent training found it useful, the link 
between training and better pay or greater job security was weak. This, in turn, 
has implications for employee demand for training. Further, there was 
significant heterogeneity about the perceived benefits from training across skill 
levels. For low skilled workers, training had to be employer initiated in 80 
percent of cases. This has implications for the desired culture of continual skill 
upgradation, and policy support for companies (especially SMEs) that aim to 
provide training. 
The demand-led view of skill development, in turn, brought to the fore the issue of 
skill shortages across sectors. An UKCES study, released in 2010, found that the 
greatest shortages (where proportion of skill-shortage vacancies (SSVs) exceeds 20 
percent) were for employees with professional and trade-specific skills. The profile of 
SSVs for these skills across the sectors is reported in Figure 21. 
                                            
 
110 The Leitch Review (2006) argued that the UK would have to target the following by 2020: (a) 95 
percent of the population to have functional literacy and numeracy skills; (b) at least 90 percent of the 
adult population to have at least Level 2 skills; (c) the balance of intermediate skills to shift from Level 
2 to Level 3; and (d) at least 40 percent of the adult population to have Level 4 skills and above. The 
targets set out in the Review were endorsed in the 2009-14 strategic plan drawn up by the UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES). 
111 The £1 billion earmarked for the programme would be diverted to funding apprenticeship 
programmes. 
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Figure 21: Profile of skill-shortage vacancies across sectors 
 
Source: Skills for Jobs: Today and Tomorrow, Volume 1, UKCES (2010), Table 3 
The skill gap is higher in North West, South West, South East and West Midlands. In 
2009, the skill gaps in these regions were 19 percent, 22 percent, 21 percent and 20 
percent, respectively. In all regions, the skill gap increased in magnitude between 
2007 and 2009.  
A report published by the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) suggested that 55 
percent of business find it more difficult to recruit skilled workers in 2007 than they 
did five years ago.112 Not surprisingly perhaps, 77 percent of business made 
professional assessment of their training needs, and 83 percent of businesses 
sourced external training for employees. Training was more likely to be provided for 
managers and senior officials (19.4 percent of employers), administrative and 
secretarial staff (15.2 percent) and professionals (13.8 percent) than for other 
employees. Almost 80 percent of businesses spent £100 per employee annually, with 
nearly half the SMEs spending £250. Interestingly, only 20 percent of the SMEs 
sourced training through their local college. Finally, while more than 72 percent of 
surveyed businesses provided management and leadership training, only 14 percent 
of them paid their managers to undertake high level qualification. 
                                            
 
112 BCC, 2007 
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Based on growth projections for the different sectors, and consequently for the 
demand for different types of skills, the 2010 UKCES study identifies the following 
high priority skills for the UK: 
Table 8: High priority skills 
Skills for immediate action Skills that are of importance but 
whose need is not critical to the 
economy 
 corporate managers as a group, 
and a range of specific 
management skills 
 management and professional 
skills in computing and software 
 professionals in certain medical 
specialisms, pharmacy, and social 
care 
 science and technology 
professionals in pharmaceutical 
and medical technology industries 
 teaching and research 
professionals across the 
education sector, especially in 
STEM related subjects 
 associate professionals and 
technical roles in a wide range of 
sectors, particularly 
manufacturing/processing 
 staff in care assistant roles, 
especially in view of the ageing 
population 
 customer service roles within the 
services sector, especially in 
retailing and after-sales 
maintenance 
 procurement, commissioning and 
financial management 
 management skills required for 
innovation in healthcare markets 
 risk management and ethics 
professionals in financial services 
sector 
 professionals involved in data 
security management and 
intellectual property exploitation 
 food technologists for 
manufacturing and process 
industries 
 urban planners and actuaries 
 science and engineering 
professionals for low carbon 
energy generation 
Source: Skills for Jobs: Today and Tomorrow, Volume 1, UKCES (2010), pp. 33-35 
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A 2010 report released by the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) highlights the 
perspective of the business sector. The survey conducted by the CBI indicates that 
there is an overwhelming need to improve employability skills at all levels of 
education. The priorities identified by the survey are as follows: 
Table 9: Business priorities for educational institutions 
Priorities for schools and colleges Priorities for higher education 
 Improve employability skills 
 Improve literacy and 
numeracy 
 Raise overall standards 
 Provide high quality 
vocational options 
 Improve science and maths 
skills 
 Provide improved career 
advice 
 Other 
70%
63%
46%
42%
28%
20%
3%
 Ensure all graduates have 
employability skills 
 Raise numbers/quality of 
STEM113 graduates 
 Encourage universities to 
provide more workforce 
training 
 Support high quality 
research/teaching 
 Support university-business 
collaboration 
 Support universities to 
diversify their provisions 
 Other 
81% 
 
42% 
 
 
37% 
 
 
 
 
31% 
 
 
29% 
 
 
28% 
 
4% 
Source: Ready to Grow: Business Priorities for Education and Skills – Education and Skills Survey 
2010, CBI (2010) 
6.2 Skill development through recession and recovery 
Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) indicate that even though 
the number of full time students graduating with a first degree has declined since the 
peak of 2003-04, the number of these graduates increased marginally during the 
recession year of 2008-09, compared to the pre-recession years of 2004-05 through 
2007-08 (Figure 22).114 This was supplemented by a continuing increase in the 
number of students who graduated with other undergraduate degrees and 
qualifications, from 45,525 in 2006-07 to 51,975 in 2008-09. These figures are 
                                            
 
113 STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, Maths 
114 Figure 6 reports the degrees awarded to students domiciled in the UK. It does not take into account 
part time degrees because it is difficult; to assign time lines to part time degrees, such that it is not 
possible to take a view on the impact of the recession on part time education.  
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consistent with information that suggests that there has been a sharp increase in the 
demand for university places during the recession and that this trend is continuing 
during the subsequent recovery. 
Figure 22: Trends in education 
 
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency 
Estimates reported by a 2010 UKCES report suggests that the paucity of resources 
that accompanies a recession may have had only a mild impact on training.115 In all 
regions of England, two-thirds or more of the surveyed employers reported training 
their employees; there was virtually no reduction relative to the corresponding 
proportions reported in 2007. However, in all the regions, there was a greater than 3 
percentage point decrease in the proportion of companies where more than 90 
percent of the employees received some training.  
CBI’s Educational and Skills Survey 2010 indicates that investment on skill 
development through training will be sustained during the upturn following the 
recession. The majority of the employers surveyed indicate that they plan to maintain 
their investment in employee training (Table 10). It should be noted that the 
employment freeze experienced by many businesses during the recession may have 
reduced the need to train new and inexperienced employees. When viewed in that 
light, the proportion of businesses envisaging no reduction in training expenditure is 
even more impressive. 
                                            
 
115 UKCES, 2010 (Table 3.29) 
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Table 10: Impact of economic climate on business plans for skills investment 
(%) 
Firm size Increase investment No change 
Reduce 
Investment 
1-49 employees 12 62 26
50-199 employees 14 56 30
200-499 
employees 
14 61 25
500-4,999 
employees 
13 56 30
5000+ employees 16 63 21
All respondents 14 58 28
Source: Ready to Grow: Business Priorities for Education and Skills – Education and Skills Survey 
2010, CBI (2010), Exhibit 9 
The British Chambers of Commerce’s Quarterly Economic Survey for Q4 of 2010 
paints a more sobering picture. It suggests that there is significant heterogeneity in 
the balance of firms that plan to increase investment in training, by both sector and 
size class (in the manufacturing sector). The balance is +12 percent for the 
manufacturing sector, and a much lower +7 percent for the services sector. In the 
manufacturing sector, the balance is +30 for medium sized (200-499 employees) 
manufacturing firms, but it is -1 for micro (1-19 employees) and +11 for small (20-199 
employees) firms. In the services sector, by contrast, there is much less variation by 
size class. The balance figures for for micro, small and medium sized firms are 0 
percent, +10 percent and +3 percent, respectively. 
At the time of the last recession in the UK, there was a 15 percent decline in the 
number of apprentices from about 367,000 in the spring of 1989 to about 312,000 in 
the spring of 1992. As such, apprenticeship as a percentage of employment was 
mildly pro-cyclical. But the impact of the nineties’ recession on apprenticeship was 
small, with the apprentice-to-employee ratio in the early nineties roughly the same as 
the corresponding ratio in the early to mid eighties.116 
However, the latest recession did not have a negative impact on the number of 
apprenticeships. The number of apprenticeships started and achieved, for both Level 
2 and Level 3, increased year-on-year between 2005-06 and 2008-09 (Figure 23). 
Given that the trend in the number of apprenticeship starts is upward sloping, 
especially for Level 2 apprenticeships, and in the absence of a counterfactual, it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of government policy on 
                                            
 
116 Felstead, 1996 
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apprenticeship starts during the recession. However, it would possibly be safe to 
conclude that government intervention played a role in sustaining the upward trend in 
apprenticeship starts in 2008-09. There was a decrease in the ratio of achievements 
to starts in 2007-08 relative to 2006-07, from 62 percent to 50 percent for Level 2 
apprenticeships, and from 59 percent to 50 percent for Level 3 apprenticeships. 
However, in 2008-09, the ratio rose again, to 62 percent and 56 percent, 
respectively. 
Figure 23: Apprenticeships starts and achieved 
 
Source: Statistical First Release archive of The Data Service 
Overall, the evidence suggests that skill formation in the workforce was not adversely 
affected by the recession. Investment in higher and further education and 
apprenticeships increased during 2007-08 and 2008-09. Training for the employed 
labour force was somewhat more affected by the downturn. However, data suggests 
that a sizeable majority of the companies may have maintained their investment in 
training and skill formation. 
6.3 Outlook for skills 
Data suggest that the recession did not have a significant negative impact on skill 
formation, which is consistent with the observation that in developed countries 
investment in human capital is generally counter-cyclical or unaffected by business 
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cycles. However, the data itself does not address an important issue that have 
implications for innovation and productivity growth in the UK in the longer run. 
UK policies on skill development emphasise spread of Level 2, Level 3 and first 
degree (or undergraduate) qualifications.117 While this raises the average productivity 
of the workforce, it is not obvious as to whether this will enable the UK to emerge as 
a “technology” leader which is likely to benefit more from a new product or process 
than those who adapt to it later. Indeed, progression of a significant proportion of the 
workforce beyond school education and the first university degree, might have to be 
an important component of the government’s strategy for skill development. 
 
                                            
 
117 For example, while a very large proportion of the students who graduate with an undergraduate 
qualification are domiciled in the UK, the proportion of UK domiciled students who graduate with a 
postgraduate qualification has declined from 55 percent in 1994-95 to 35 percent in 2008-09. 
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7. Business Investment 
 
 The decline in business investment was much more rapid during the 
most recent recession than during the recession of the 1980s and the 
1990s 
 
 Further levels of business investment will depend on uncertainty about 
future economic growth, availability and cost of credit 
 
 While the quantity of business investment for the medium run is difficult 
to predict, the quality of the investment is likely to improve 
 
 
Data for G7 countries suggest that aggregate business investment is pro-cyclical, 
and also more volatile than output.118 Data suggest that while business investment 
declines with output during recessions, it lags output growth during the early part of 
the recovery period. 
The impact of a financial crisis on business investment could be more severe. 
Recessions induced by financial crises generally last longer than cyclical recessions, 
an average of 1.9 years in case of the former as opposed to a few months for the 
latter.119 The subsequent recovery is also generally weaker, especially if the extent of 
financial restructuring is significant. The (potentially self-fulfilling) expectation about 
weak future demand has adverse implications for demand for credit and business 
investment. The problem of a weak appetite for credit and investment on the part of 
the companies could be further aggravated if the recovery is fraught with 
macroeconomic uncertainties. 
Financial crises also affect the supply of credit adversely, as banks and other 
financial institutions become risk averse and as the credit worthiness of borrowers is 
reduced by weak economic growth. As a consequence, recapitalisation of banks, 
whether by way of government interaction or by way of lower dividend and bonus 
payouts, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for increase in the flow of credit 
in the aftermath of financial crises. It is also difficult to identify firms that are most 
likely to find it difficult to finance their investment needs. Evidence from countries 
such as South Korea, which have experienced severe financial crises in the recent 
past, suggests that post-crisis distribution of credit is influenced not by firm 
characteristics such as size, but by banks’ perceptions about the efficiency of the 
potential borrowers.120 Prior to the crisis, firms connected to the large, highly 
                                            
 
118 Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994 
119 Rogoff and Reinhardt, 2009 
120 Borensztein and Lee 2002 
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leveraged and often inefficient chaebols easier access to credit than their non-
chaebol counterparts. After the crisis, however, the relative advantage of the 
chaebols disappeared, and access to credit was largely determined by track record 
of profitability. 
7.1 Business investment during recession and recovery 
Data for business investment for the past three recessions in the UK, and their 
corresponding recovery periods (Figure 24), demonstrate that 
 from the start of a recession, it took eighteen quarters or more for the volume 
of business investment to recover to pre-recession levels, and 
 the decline in business investment was much more rapid during the most 
recent recession than during the recessions of the eighties and the nineties.121 
Figure 24: Business investment during past and most recent recessions and 
recoveries 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
Note: The index numbers are based on seasonally adjusted business investment data in 2006 prices. 
The evidence about the decline in business investment is consistent with data on net 
credit disbursals by UK financial institutions (Figure 25). Net credit disbursals to the 
four key sectors of the UK economy have been persistently negative since Q2 of 
2009. While the pace at which companies are deleveraging has declined since Q1 of 
                                            
 
121 The data show that business investment returned to growth in 2010Q1, increasing by 7.9% on the 
quarter. In the subsequent quarter, the last quarter for which data are available, growth slowed to 
0.7%. During the course of the 2008-09 downturn, business investment fell peak-to-trough by 28.4%. 
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2010, as the economy embarked on the path to recovery, the net lending levels 
continue to be negative. 
Figure 25: Quarterly net lending flows (by UK MFIs) 
 
Source: Bank of England 
7.2 Outlook for Business Investment 
Future levels of business investment in the UK will depend on a number of factors. 
Companies are unlikely to step up investment significantly unless there is a decline in 
the uncertainty about the future of economic growth in the industrialised world. 
Thereafter, the growth of investment would depend in part on the demand for the 
companies’ goods and services, and in part on the availability and cost of credit. The 
cost of capital is likely to be higher in future than in the previous business cycle, 
when risk was systematically underpriced.  
However, given the level of uncertainty, demand, interest rates and other factors that 
affect business environment, credit could flow to the more innovative and efficient 
companies, and companies themselves are more likely to opt for projects, products 
and processes that make more efficient use of available financial resources. There 
could, therefore, be a greater impact per dollar of business investment on output, 
with positive implications for productivity. In other words, while the trend for the 
quantity of business investment for the medium run is difficult to predict, the quality of 
the investment is likely to improve. 
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8. Innovation 
 
 A relatively smaller proportion of firms in the UK appear to undertake 
innovation compared with some other industrialised countries, whether 
technological or non-technological, and this is apparent in both 
manufacturing and services. This is a consequence of low incidence of 
innovation among SMEs 
 
 The impact of the financial crisis and the recession on innovation is yet 
to be well understood as data are not yet available.  However, there are 
indications that around a third of firms were incurring intangible 
investments during the recession 
 
 The main challenges in the UK are structural in nature and require the 
existence of an innovation system that facilitates collaboration both 
between and among creators such as universities and users of 
knowledge such as businesses 
 
 
The importance of innovation in driving productivity growth is well documented in the 
academic literature. It has been recognised that traditional measures of innovation 
such as R&D expenditures underestimate the extent of innovation that is undertaken 
by companies. Indeed, according to OECD estimates, R&D was undertaken by 
around a third of all UK firms in 2002 - 2004. R&D intensity is particularly low among 
SMEs. Only in Canada (49.3 percent), Germany (33 percent) and South Korea (40.9 
percent) do more than a third of SMEs perform R&D. By contrast, more than 60 
percent of large firms perform R&D in most countries, with fewer than 50 percent of 
large firms performing R&D only in Japan (47.9 percent) and New Zealand (53.5 
percent).122 In the UK, 32.4 percent of SMEs and 53.5 percent of large firms perform 
R&D. The proportion of companies that undertake R&D continuously is lower still.123 
Hence, innovation is increasingly interpreted to include a wider range of activities 
than just research and development (R&D).124  
Evidence from developed countries125 suggests that larger firms are more likely to 
undertake innovation, especially if they have international exposure. Both the 
likelihood of undertaking innovation and the magnitude of investment in innovation 
are higher for companies that belong to groups and those that cooperate with other 
companies. Interestingly, the likelihood of innovation is also positively correlated with 
                                            
 
122 Data for Australia are not available. 
123 OECD, 2009 (Table S-13) 
124 OECD, 2009 (Chapters 1 & 2) 
125 OECD, 2009 (Table 3.2) 
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the companies’ perceptions about the difficulties in accessing factor and product 
markets. In part, this could be on account of endogeneity, i.e., companies discovering 
barriers to market access only when they try to innovate. However, this could also 
indicate that existence of barriers necessitate innovation to sustain growth despite 
the barriers.  
As mentioned earlier, the scope for innovation arguably increases significantly during 
periods of economic downturn. It is generally accepted that a company’s ability to 
undertake R&D and incur certain other kinds of expenditure is cyclical, and hence 
such expenditures are likely to be low during periods of downturn. However, as the 
opportunity cost of a company’s resources is reduced on account of the downturn, it 
has a greater opportunity to reorganise production and other business processes 
without sacrificing growth. 
8.1 Policy discussion in the UK 
Evidence reported by the OECD and highlighted in Table 11 suggests the following 
about innovation in the UK: 
 Overall, a relatively small fraction of the firms undertake innovation. Fewer 
than 40 percent of surveyed firms undertake process or product innovation. A 
similarly small proportion of firms undertake non-technological innovation.126 
While cross-country comparisons are inherently difficult for a variety of 
reasons, data suggest that the incidence of innovation is noticeably lower than 
in Germany which is widely recognised as being a technology and productivity 
leader. 
 The low incidence of innovation is apparent in both the manufacturing and 
services sectors. 
This low incidence of innovation is a consequence of low incidence of innovation 
among SMEs. About 60 percent of larger firms undertake product or process 
innovation, as also non-technological innovation. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
126 This is consistent with more recent information which suggests that, uring the 2006-08 period. 27.1 
percent of firms undertake either product or process innovation, while only 26.5 percent of the firms 
undertake wider innovation. The corresponding figures for SMEs are 26 percent and 24.5 percent, 
respectively (from BIS, 2010). 
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Table 11: Innovation in the UK 2002-2004 (%) 
 
All 
firms SMEs Large Manufacturing Services
Introduced product 
innovation 
32.7
(43.3)
32.1
(41.3)
49.0
(71.9)
35.8 
(52.2) 
30.8
(35.8)
Introduced process 
innovation 
20.1
(36.2)
19.4
(34.3)
38.2
(64.1)
23.6 
(40.8) 
17.7
(31.9)
Introduced either 
product or process 
innovation 
38.7
(56.2)
37.9
(54.4)
57.6
(83.4)
41.9 
(65.9) 
36.5
(47.9)
Developed in-house 
product or process 
innovation 
34.0
(36.0)
33.2
(40.1)
53.9
(64.7)
37.9 
(46.2) 
31.3
(27.3)
Introduced new-to-
market product 
innovation 
19.3
(17.5)
18.8
(16.2)
31.3
(37.3)
21.1 
(25.5) 
18.2
(10.5)
Performed R&D 33.2
(35.1)
32.4
(33.0)
53.5
(65.8)
40.2 
(47.3) 
28.3
(24.3)
Introduced a 
marketing innovation 
23.6
(25.2)
23.0
(23.9)
36.4
(43.5)
22.1 
(28.1) 
24.7
(23.1)
Introduced an 
organisational 
innovation 
31.2
(54.8)
30.2
(53.2)
54.8
(78.2)
30.1 
(56.0) 
32.0
(53.6)
Introduced a non-
technological 
innovation 
37.5
(61.1)
36.5
(59.5)
61.3
(83.5)
36.8 
(63.7) 
38.0
(58.9)
Notes: The figures in the table refer to percentage of firms that undertook the stated activity during the 
period 2002-2004. The figures within parentheses are corresponding figures for Germany. 
Source: OECD (2009), Annexe 1.A1, Statistical Tables 
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Economists at the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts 
(NESTA) argue that innovation has played an important role in driving labour 
productivity growth in the UK - it accounted for about two-thirds of the growth in 
labour productivity between 2000 and 2007.127 They estimate innovation related 
expenditures of the private sector, in 2007, to be £133.4 billion, i.e., 14 percent of the 
private sector gross value added. Training and skills development (24 percent), 
organisational improvement (19.5 percent), design (16.5 percent) and software 
development (15 percent) account for a significant proportion of this expenditure. 
R&D accounts for a smaller proportion of the gross value added.  
This is consistent with the data from the UK Innovation Survey 2009, highlighted in 
Figure 26, which suggests that acquisition of capital that embody technological 
progress accounted for at least as high a proportion of 2008 expenditures as internal 
R&D.  
Figure 26: Innovation across sectors  
 
Source: UK Innovation Survey 2009: Science and Innovation Analysis (Figure 2.6) 
The Innovation Survey 2009 also suggests that about 27 percent of the surveyed 
firms reported having undertaken “wider” forms of innovation such as changes in 
corporate strategy and organisational structure. As in the case of product and 
process innovation, wider innovation is more common among large firms (39 percent) 
than among small firms (24.5 percent). The incidence of wider innovation was 
                                            
 
127 NESTA, 2009 
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predictably higher in sectors such as knowledge intensive services than in sectors 
such as construction and retail and distribution. 
The NESTA report suggests that, as highlighted in Figure 27, the extent of innovation 
also varies considerably across the regions. Business enterprise R&D expenditure as 
a percentage of gross value added is high in the East (3.75 percent) and South East 
(1.9 percent) of England, but very low in the North East (0.78 percent) and Yorkshire 
and Humber (0.48 percent). However, the UK Innovation Survey 2009 indicates that 
the incidence of innovation across all the regions is roughly the same, with 60-68 
percent of the surveyed firms reporting at least one form of innovative activity, when 
non-R&D forms of innovation are taken into account. 
Figure 27: Business enterprise R&D across regions 
 
Source: Innovation Report 2009, NESTA 
The NESTA report draws the following conclusions about the innovation system in 
the UK: 
 A competitive business environment that induces innovative activities on the 
part of companies exists in the UK, driven by high birth rates of new 
companies. 
 Even though the UK financial sector itself is highly sophisticated, access to 
credit remains a bottleneck for some firms. (This finds support in the data from 
the UK Innovation Survey 2009, which ranks cost of finance and availability of 
finance as two of the three biggest barriers to innovation.) 
 Even though conditions have improved over the years, companies continue to 
experience difficulties finding people with appropriate skills. 
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 Companies in the UK are less open to ideas from overseas, and are also less 
likely to use customers as a source for innovation than the leading countries. 
They are also less likely to buy high tech products that facilitate or even 
embody innovation. 
 While research institutions in the UK, many of which receive public support for 
their research, have sustained their international reputation, collaboration 
between these institutions and the industry continues to be low. 
Over past five years, a number of reports128 have examined ways to improve 
innovation in the UK. Many of them emphasise R&D and technological innovation 
more than non-technological innovation, and this is not surprising given the emerging 
consensus that the UK economy has to be rebalanced, towards manufacturing and 
away from financial services and the construction-property industries. However, there 
is also recognition that other forms of innovation can be more suitable for industries 
in which UK’s position as a global leader should be preserved. Most importantly, the 
reports strongly endorse the “innovation system” paradigm, encouraging much 
greater cooperation between creators of knowledge such as universities and users of 
knowledge such as businesses, and also encouraging creation of infrastructure and 
institutions that facilitate rapid dispersion of created knowledge. 
8.2 Innovation during Recession and Recovery 
The impact of the financial crisis and the recession on innovation is yet to be well 
understood. Indeed, time series data that can facilitate comparison of UK’s R&D 
investment and intangible investment before, during and after the recession are not 
available for the 2008-2010 period (Figure 28).129 
                                            
 
128 These include the Cox Report (2005), vury Report (2007), Dyson Report (2010), and Hauser 
Report (2010) 
129 Intangible investments include expenditure on software, design, advertising, mineral exploration, as 
well as tangible investments (Tang) in capital goods such as computer hardware. 
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Figure 28: Trends in R&D and intangible investments 
 
Source: COINVEST project (www.coinvest.org.uk) & NESTA’s Innovation Index project 
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Figure 29: Innovation during the recession 
 
Source: Economic & Labour Market Review, Vol. 4, No. 7, July 2010 
However, a survey launched by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in October 
2009 provides a snapshot of innovation during the recession period. It suggests that 
during the recession a small fraction of firms were investing in R&D, and R&D 
expenditure was higher, on average, among manufacturing companies than among 
services sector companies (Figure 29), as during normal times. 
Data on the wider measures of innovation, which includes activities such as 
corporate restructuring which become particularly important during recessions, do not 
permit comparison of intangible investments before, during and after the recession.  
However, data collected by the ONS suggest that a fair proportion of firms were 
making intangible investments, particularly in training and software (Figure 29). 
Hence, there is perhaps some scope for optimism about the extent of innovation in 
the UK during the recession. 
8.3 Outlook for innovation 
The main challenges for innovation in the UK are structural in nature. As noted earlier 
(Table 11), a significantly smaller proportion of firms in the UK are involved in either 
product and process innovation compared to global leaders such as Germany. This 
is true for both the manufacturing and services sectors. The gap is particularly large 
for organisational innovation and non-technological innovation. The gap vis-à-vis 
global leaders is large for both SMEs and large firms. By contrast, the gap is 
negligible for the proportion of firms that undertake R&D. The emphasis of any policy 
aimed at enhancing innovation therefore has to be on non-R&D innovation.  
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It has also been recognised that rapid and continual innovation requires the 
existence of an innovation “system” that facilitates collaboration among creators and 
users of knowledge. This requires interaction among creators and users of 
knowledge – e.g., interaction between universities within countries and across 
international borders – and between creators of knowledge such as universities and 
users of knowledge such as businesses. It also requires interaction between 
companies and end-users of their products to facilitate demand-driven innovation, 
and interaction among companies to facilitate rapid spread of business best 
practices. 
Traditionally, the role of government in fostering innovation has been viewed through 
the lens of fiscal incentives like tax credit for R&D expenditure. However, the wider 
definition of innovation, and the increasing emphasis on cooperation and 
collaboration within an innovation system also emphasises the role of a government 
as a facilitator for such collaboration, e.g., by putting in place the necessary 
infrastructure and an appropriate system of intellectual property rights. In the 
absence of a well-thought out strategy that encompasses the private and higher 
education sectors, and facilitates both their interaction with each other and their 
integration into the global innovation eco-system, innovation may prove to be the 
most significant bottleneck for productivity growth in the longer run. 
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9. Outlook for productivity 
growth in recovery 
The cyclical aspects of the recession are unlikely to have an impact on productivity 
growth during the course of the recovery. To recapitulate, available information about 
the impact of the recession on the determinants of productivity suggests the 
following: 
 Early-stage entrepreneurial activity has proved resilient in the aftermath of the 
recent recession, even though access to finance proved difficult for nascent 
entrepreneurs.  
 There was an increase in the number of insolvencies during this recession but 
it is not obvious whether this was chiefly driven by Schumpeterian dynamics or 
short term financial pressures. There are indications that the gap between the 
UK goods market efficiency with the USA and Germany has declined since the 
onset of the recession. The prognosis for the UK labour market efficiency is 
quite favourable 
 There has been a sharp increase in the demand for university places during 
the recession and this trend is continuing during the subsequent recovery. 
While training may have been adversely impacted by the recession, neither 
enrolment in FE and HE institutions nor apprenticeships were adversely 
affected. Hence, as business investment recovers towards the pre-recession 
level, and companies invest in their future growth, they are likely to have 
access to a larger pool of skilled workers. 
 The decline in business investment was much more rapid during the most 
recent recession than during the recession of the 1980s and the 1990s. While 
the typically pro-cyclical nature of business investment may be suggestive of a 
positive outlook, further levels of business investment will be affected by 
uncertainty about future economic growth, availability and cost of credit130. 
Although the quantity of business investment for the medium run is difficult to 
predict, the quality of the investment is likely to improve 
 The impact of the financial crisis and the recession on innovation is yet to be 
well understood as data are not yet available.  However, there are indications 
that around a third of firms were incurring intangible investments during the 
recession 
                                            
 
130 Indeed, whether business investment recovers to the pre-crisis levels would also depend on the 
change in composition of UK’s industrial sector, and on future strategic initiatives of companies. For 
example, there might be faster growth in industries that are less capital intensive. Equally, companies 
might emphasise investment in intangibles much more than investment in tangible assets such as 
capital. 
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88 
If, therefore, the business environment in the UK provides the incentive for 
companies to adopt new technologies and innovate to develop better products and 
processes, as such, they may not be constrained by availability of basic factor inputs 
such as capital (which also embodies technology) and (skilled) labour. However, 
structural problems may impede the pace of productivity growth. These include: 
 Enterprise is hindered by risk aversion and lack of ambition; both growth 
ambitions and rates of innovation are low among a wide range of UK 
businesses, and early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the UK is still lower 
than in the USA and emerging economies 
 Competition may discourage innovation among firms that are far away from 
the technology frontier and this may be the reason why innovation levels are 
low among a sizeable proportion of firms in the UK 
 The weakness of UK infrastructure compared with other industrialised 
economies is a concern regularly expressed by business and can be traced 
back to low levels of investment over long time periods. The future of the UK 
infrastructure is likely to depend on the ability to sustain investment in the 
present fiscal and financial environment and on the ability successfully to 
implement productivity-augmenting flexible working to mitigate transport 
congestion. The latter in turn will depend on digital infrastructure quality 
 Even though the recession did not have a significant impact on skill formation, 
it is not obvious whether this will enable the UK to emerge as a technology 
leader given the existing weaknesses in the skill base compared to other 
industrialised countries. Furthermore, while the skills policies might increase 
the average skill level of the working population – an important goal by its own 
right – it is not obvious whether the emphasis on Level 2, Level 3 and first (or 
undergraduate) degree qualifications will enable the UK to emerge as a global 
technology leader 
 A relatively smaller proportion of firms in the UK undertake innovation 
compared with some other industrialised countries, whether technological or 
non-technological, and this is apparent in both manufacturing and services. 
This is a consequence of low incidence of innovation among SMEs. 
Furthermore, it is not obvious as to whether interaction between the private 
sector and HE institutions, and also between UK companies and universities 
and their counterparts in other countries will grow at a pace that is consistent 
with the UK becoming a pivotal node for the global innovation eco-system. 
More data and a careful analysis are required to take a view on this issue.  
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